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All Roads Are Good: Beyond the Lexicon of 
Christianity in Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
Verna C. Sanchez * 
I studied under Grandpa Fools Crow, a Lakota holy man. He said 
never bad-mouth anybody, never be envious or jealous of anybody; 
if you are; you won't be on the right road yourself, 'cause all 
roads are good. 
-Abe Conklinl 
Thou shalt have no other gods before me . . . for I the Lord thy 
God am a jealous God . ... 
-Exodus2 
I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Fa-
ther, but by me. 
-St. John3 
INTRODUCTION 
The journey of religious freedom in this country has been a linear one. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law, B.A. Clark 
University, 1977, J.D. Northeastern University School of Law, 1981. I wish to thank both 
Hans W. Leo and Professor Linda Fitts Mischler for their thoughtful and insightful read-
ings, comments, criticisms and suggestions, as well as their encouragement and support, 
throughout the writing of this Article. I also want to thank my Research Assistant, Andrea 
Hromi for all of her work on this Article. Finally, many thanks to Stephanie Edwards and 
Nan Kelly of the Roger Williams Law Library for all of their quick and diligent work. 
l. ALL ROADS ARE GooD: NATIVE VOICES ON LIFE AND CuLTURE 7 (Terence Winch ed., 
1994) [hereinafter ALL ROADS ARE GooD]. 
2. Exodus 1:20. "For the Lord thy God is a jealous God." Deuteronomy 15:6. 
3. John 9: 14. 
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Its point of departure was, on one hand, tolerance for religious beliefs and 
protection from state mandated religion, but on the other, an unspoken con-
sensus that religion was, if not exclusively Protestantism, then certainly 
Christianity. This course was set by the Founding Fathers and the fIrst 
courts to interpret the Free Exercise Clause, and there has been virtually no 
deviation since. While there have been stops along the way which have 
broadened slightly the highway traveled, there has been no change in direc-
tion, reevaluation of the itinerary, or toleration of alternate routes. 
In this Article, I argue that in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise 
Clause, religion has always been defmed in a linear, hegemonic way. This 
monochromatic approach to the spiritual and sacred has worked as a road-
block, almost always preventing those who believe in and practice animist, 
earth-based, non-monotheistic traditions from ever being permitted the same 
level of religious freedom accorded others. 
This Article examines the fundamental premises of monotheism and ab-
solutism founded in Judeo-Christian traditions and explores how they have 
permeated Free Exercise jurisprudence and effectively blockaded the road to 
equal constitutional protection to those walking other paths. The narrow-
ness of the jurisprudence is not merely a quaint historical fact. It continues 
to shut out all but fairly narrow views of religion, religious beliefs, tradi-
tions, and ideas about the sacred and spiritual. This remains true, despite 
the slight expansion of the defmition of religion applied in more recent Free 
Exercise cases. The demand for absolutes in religiot1--{)ne God, one way, 
an "ultimate and comprehensive 'truth",4-is matched by courts' aversion to 
"ad hoc justice,,5 in the realm of Free Exercise. They are two sides of the 
same coin, and they work together to deprive those who practice and believe 
in earth-based religions,6 of true legal protection for their rituals and beliefs. 
The jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause has arrived at a cross-
roads.' If courts persist in applying the narrow, Judeo-Christian view of re-
ligion, then the linear journey will proceed, leaving many behind. If, how-
ever, courts choose to broaden their perspective, a more inclusive, 
panoramic view of religion will emerge. This shift will require a systematic 
and fundamental transformation of the underlying premises, biases, and 
craving for absolute predictability manifested in current jurisprudence. It 
calls for a commitment to recasting the analytical framework of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, and reevaluating and reworking ideas about what constitutes 
religion and religious belief. 
4. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). 
5. Id. at 210. 
6. I will not attempt to define earth-based religions, for all the reasons set forth in this 
Article. However, examples of earth-based religions, as I use the tenn here, include many 
Native American spiritual beliefs and practices that recognize that all of nature is alive and 
is sacred. Santeria is another such example of this type of spiritual tradition. A common 
focal point of earth-based religions is the individual's relationship to nature. 
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From the earliest days of the drafting, planning, and writing of the 
United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights, two seemingly contradic-
tory positions were in play. First, Americans would have a freedom of relig-
ion greater than that experienced under British rule. But second, this free-
dom was viewed from a perspective which assumed that those protected 
were both believers in one God and Christians of one sort or another. This 
assumption ran through the earliest jurisprudence of First Amendment Free 
Exercise claims and continues, in varying degrees, to this day. Indeed, the 
underlying assumption of Christianity has and continues to pervade Ameri-
can life. 
This Article will consider the lexicon of Christianity in the jurisprudence 
of the Free Exercise Clause, from its early roots to the present day. While 
historically the idea of constitutionally ensuring the free exercise of religion 
went hand in hand with the idea of opposing the establishment of religion by 
the government, these ideas meant slightly different things for each of the 
Founding Fathers. As Jesse Choper has noted, the framers were "animated 
by several separate and sometimes opposing goals.,,7 However, those differ-
ences had a common foundation in Christian beliefs and practices. The nar-
rowly constructed, monotheistic, Christian perspective, which colored the 
struggle for religious freedom in the early days of this country, excluded 
non-Christians (and some Christians l from the ideas, rights and protections 
7. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL IN-
TERPRET A TION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 3 (1995). 
Thomas Jefferson, for example, believed that "an established church constituted one of 
the gravest threats to freedom of the mind because it provided the 'orthodox' doctrine 
which civil authorities were to promote through coercive legal means." ARLIN ADAMS & 
CHARLES EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 25 (1990). James Madison, later in life, reached the 
conclusion that presidential religious proclamations (which he had issued), violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as did the chaplain system. JOHN A. 
SEMONCHE, RELIGION AND CONSTITUTIONAL GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW WITH SOURCES 29 (1986). And although Madison had issued proc-
lamations asking people to pray, he also vetoed an act for the District of Columbia, which 
sought to establish an Episcopal church. Id. Roger Williams, perhaps not surprisingly, 
was an advocate of the "Evangelical theory of separation," that is, church and state separa-
tion was necessary to protect the sanctity of the church. CHOPER, supra at 3. Williams, of 
course, had been banished from Massachusetts by the Puritans because of his religious be-
liefs. SEMONCHE, supra, at 6. 
8. "Basically, then, the regimes of almost all the colonies enthroned strictly defined 
Protestant orthodoxies and called upon everyone for material and overt respect for the re-
ligious establishments ... , The disfavored minorities included deviant Protestants as well 
as the more heretical Roman Catholics and Jews .... " MARVIN E. FRANKEL, FAITH AND 
FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 24 (1994). Massachusetts Bay's immigration 
policies are also instructive-restrictions affected "Quakers, Catholics, Jews, 'Familists, 
Antinomians, and other Enthusiasts.'" John Witte, The Essential Rights and Liberties of 
Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 380 
(1996) (citation omitted). This kind of limited welcome was not confined to Massachu-
setts, but was true throughout New England. Id. 
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of religious freedom. This legacy, to varying degrees, continues today. Al-
though the language of the religion clause is neutral,9 the cultural context 
and climate in which it arose was overwhelmingly Christian. to That per-
spective informed and shaped the early jurisprudence of First Amendment 
claims. 
Part I of this Article will examine the early jurisprudence of the Free 
Exercise Clause. Because of the Christian lexicon, the framework for Free 
Exercise analysis has been, and continues to be, religion-specific, at great 
cost to those religions that do not derive from, or have any connection to, a 
monotheistic, Judeo-Christian tradition. Courts' legal analysis of free exer-
cise claims arising from beliefs or practices that stand outside this frame-
work, such as polytheistic or animistic and/or non-hierarchical and non-
institutionalized religions, result almost inevitably in less protection and 
fewer rights than those afforded Judea-Christian religions. The overwhelm-
ing, pervasive Judea-Christian framework generally hampers the equal and 
fair treatment of Free Exercise claims falling outside this model. 
This Judea-Christian-centered model and the dilemma it creates for 
genuine religious freedom is best evidenced in the treatment of Native 
American 11 religious claims by United States courts, throughout American 
jurisprudential history and continuing through the present day. While pater-
nalism or racism accounts for many of the wrongs committed against Native 
Americans in this country, at least as to Indian Free Exercise claims, there is 
more to the story. There is little or no acknowledgment by judges that they 
are judging from within a purely Judea-Christian framework of thinking 
about, defining or "measuring" religious beliefs and practices, which skews 
their perspective when looking at other religions. This may be based on one 
or more circumstances: a judge's own religious beliefs, traditions and expe-
riences which consciously or unconsciously color his or her view of the 
claim before the court; judicial precedent which, from its earliest days has 
been developed from an explicitly Christian perspective; or the dominance of 
Judeo-Christian values which permeates American culture. While there are 
exceptions, it is a general truth that "other" belief systems do not, and can-
not, "measure up" to Judea-Christian indicia of what constitutes a religious 
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
10. Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990). In Carolina, for example, atheists were banned 
from the colony, and all persons in the colony were required to be members of a church. 
[d. at 1429. '''Any seven or more persons agreeing in any religion, shall constitute a 
church' ... and could worship without molestation, provided they adhered to three tenets: 
that there is a God, that God is to be publicly worshiped and that it is lawful and the duty 
of every man to bear ... witness .... " [d. (citation omitted). 
11. Throughout this Article, I use the terms Native Americans and Indians inter-
changeably. 
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belief or practice worthy of constitutional protection. 12 Even the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act,13 has done virtually nothing to protect Indian 
religious rights, in part because no private cause of action exists. 14 This is 
almost equally true of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,15 
which merely restored the pre-Smith compelling interest test,16 which itself 
had done little to protect minority religions. 17 Even this limited relief is illu-
12. State v. Big Sheep, 243 P. 1067 (Mont. 1926), although dated, exemplifies this 
principle. There, a court rejected a Crow's claim that possession of peyote was protected 
by the First Amendment. In its holding that the criminalization of peyote possession was 
consistent with maintaining the "peace, good order and morals of society," id. at 1073, the 
court relied heavily on the Bible in its decision. "We do not find peyote or any like herb 
mentioned by Isaiah, or by Saint Paul in his epistle to the Romans,nor does it seem from 
the language employed that Saint John the Divine had any such in mind." Id. Of course I 
am not saying here, or anywhere else in the Article, that religious freedoms are always 
denied when they turn on beliefs or religions deviant from, or outside a Judeo-Christian 
norm. Nor am I saying that religious claims based on Judeo-Christian religions always 
succeed. However, the scales generally tip in favor of Judeo-Christian beliefs, and against 
those outside that framework. See for example, some of the early Jehovah's Witness or 
Mormon cases. Overall, those outside the Judeo-Christian framework have less success 
and much greater difficulties obtaining meaningful protections under the law. Tushnet 
states "sometimes Christians win, but non-Christians never do." See Mark Tushnet, "Of 
Church and State and the Supreme Court: Kurland Revisited," 1989 SUP. Cr. REv. 373, 
381. 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) (amended 1994). 
14. Havasupai v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990). "AIRFA does not 
create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable rights." Id. at 1488 (citing Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988) (emphasis 
added)). See also Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 793 (D.S.D. 1982) (stating that the 
Act does not create a cause of action in federal courts for violation of rights of religious 
freedom); New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. ICC, 702 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
See generally Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom And Governmental De-
velopment of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447 (1985); Note, The American Indian Relig-
ious Freedom Act-An Answer to the Indians' Prayers?, 29 S.D. L. REv. 131 (1983); Re-
bekah J. French, Free Exercise of Religion On the Public Lands, 11 PUB. LAND L. REv. 
197 (1990). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). 
16. An incidental burden on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a compel-
ling state interest "in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to 
regulate." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
17. See Tushnet, supra note 12; Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. Clll. L. REv. 1109 (1990) (noting that political branches more often 
respect prominent, "majority" faiths). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The 
Problem of Burdens on The Free Exercise Of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 947-60 
(1989); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REv. 1, 
56 (1993) (stating that the "essential to" language deleted from the Act would have made a 
greater difference than simply restoring the pre-Smith compelling interest test). But see 
James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1412 (1992) (pointing out that most free exercise claim-
ants were losing even prior to Smith). For pro-Smith arguments, see Maria Elise Lasso, 
Notes and Comments, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the 
State of the Free Exercise Doctrine, 12 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 569 (1993); Elise West, 
The Case Against A Right To Religion Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETlllCS & 
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sory, as one federal district court declared the Act unconstitutional. 18 Al-
though that decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit,19 the district court 
decision may be a sign of things to come. 20 Constitutional history clearly 
establishes the Christian roots of both the establishment of the United States 
and the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 21 That assumption of 
Christian belief continues to dominate the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise 
Clause. Earth-based spritual traditions and practices, which tend to be non-
institutionalized, non-hierarchical, and nature-centered, stand in almost di-
rect opposition to Christian structures and beliefs. As such, they present a 
direct challenge to the current jurisprudential structure. 
The majority of earth-based religious claims have been brought by Na-
tive Americans. Part II of this Article will examine a number of cases 
where Native Americans sought protection for particular religious traditions, 
beliefs and practices,22 and how those claims fared in the courts in light of 
the lexicon of Christianity. As will be shown, the belief in "one way," as 
defmed by Judeo-Christian traditions, continues to operate as a roadblock to 
protections for non-Judeo-Christian beliefs. 
Finally, Part III of this Article will look at current definitions of religion 
relied upon by many courts. Some courts, as well as scholars, are looking at 
how religion has been explicitly or implicitly defmed, how those defmitions 
have excluded non-Christian religions, and to what effect. While well-
PuB. POL'y 596-98 (1990) (arguing that the compelling state interest test leads to unpre-
dictable results), cited in Lasso, supra, at 584, n.117; William P. Marshall, The Inequality 
of Anti-Establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 63. 
18. Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.O. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 
1352 (5th Cir. 1996). 
19. Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996). 
20. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari and will hear the case this term. 
1996 WL 375944, 65 U.S.L.W. 3017 (1996). For arguments about the constitutionality of 
the Act, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.V. L. REv. 437 (1994); Eugene Gressman & 
Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 
(1996); Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court At Its Word: The Implications for the 
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5 (1995); Daniel O. Conkle, The Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance Of An Unconstitutional 
Statute, 56 MONT. L. REv. 39 (1995); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act: Letting The Fox Into The Henhouse Under Cover Of Section 5 Of The 14th 
Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 357 (1995). 
21. "There are no religious establishments, no preference of one denomination of 
Christians above another." Witte, supra note 8, at 373 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added); A Century Sermon on the Glorious Revolution, in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805 969, 988-99 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) (emphasis 
added). See also McConnell, supra note 10; Daniel O. Conkle, Dijferent Religions, Dif-
ferent Polities: Evaluating the Role of Religious Traditions in American Politics And 
Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1994). 
22. I use the terms religion and religious here for purposes of convenience, all the while 
recognizing that doing so is perhaps not the most meaningful or helpful way of discussing 
beliefs and practices outside Judeo-Christian, institutionalized religious doctrines. How-
ever, these are the terms the courts have typically used to measure the claims before them. 
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intentioned, there are inherent problems in attempting to lock onto a single 
defmition, even a broad one. I argue that the need for a fIXed defmition de-
rives from a traditional Judea-Christian perspective and will continue to ex-
clude those standing outside such a focus. Part ill will consider these new 
defmitions and establish why these new approaches will fail to truly protect 
religious freedoms. The rejection of both defmitions of religion and the in-
terest in formulating them is a necessary and vital step in beginning to offer 
true constitutional protections to non-Judeo-Christian religious claims. 
PART I: FREEDOM TO BELIEVE-IN THE ONE 
GOD WE TRUST 
The Founding Fathers held differing positions regarding religion gener-
ally and Christianity in particular. These differences are consistent with the 
general state of the political and religious culture of this country during the 
eighteenth century. Although it is true that "most of the founding fathers 
had not put much emotional stock in religion, even when they were regular 
churchgoers,,,23 this was not necessarily reflected in the controlling view. 
Rather, religion, specifically Protestant Christianity, was quickly and thor-
oughly implanted in American life. However, while there was no question 
that religion would playa critical role in the formation of the American na-
tion, the beginning days of the nation were, as historian Gordon Wood has 
made clear, a time of upheaval and change.24 "Paternal authority" was be-
ing questioned. "Even the authority of the supreme father of all, God him-
self, was not immune to challenge. ,,25 Gordon Wood suggests that a subtle 
movement occurred, from a Puritan view based on the Old Testament, to a 
Christ-centered New Testament focus. 26 
Many of the theological struggles of late eighteenth century America 
were cast in the same terms as the debates over parental child-raising. Did 
people need coercion and the terror of eternal damnation by an absolute God 
to make them righteous? Was it only fear for their future existence that 
could make people bow to a sovereign God? Or could people be brought to 
humility and salvation better through Christ's love and compassion?27 
This shift in focus is evident in the various "camps" that formed around 
the creation of the religion clause. These various stances naturally colored 
the goals sought in framing the Bill of Rights and the perspectives behind 
23. GoRDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 330 (1991) 
[hereinafter G. WOOD]' 
24. See generally G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 155-59. 
25. Id. at 158. But see ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE 
AND INSTITUTION 51 (1976). ("It is not from God the Father that we derive the idea of pa-
ternal authority; it is out of the struggle for paternal control of the family that God the Fa-
ther is created."). 
26. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 158. 
27. Id. 
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them While generalizations cannot accurately capture and reflect the true 
dynamics of the time, they will be relied upon here simply as a means of 
furthering the discussion. The Founding Fathers are often divided into sev-
eral general categories for the purpose of discussing the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment. Adams and Emmerich labeled these categories: 1) 
the Enlightened Separationists; 2) the Political Centrists; and 3) the Pietistic 
Separationists.28 
The Enlightened Separationists (Witte's enlightenment thinkers), includ-
ing such men as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, believed strongly in 
the idea of a clear separation of church and state.29 As Witte has noted: 
"The primary purpose of Enlightenment writers was political, not theologi-
cal. They sought not only to free religion and the church from the interfer-
ence of politics and the state, as did the evangelicals, but, more importantly, 
to free politics and the state from the intrusion of religion and the church . 
. . " Witte further noted: "To allow them to combine would be to their mu-
tual disadvantage---to produce, in Thomas Paine's words, 'a sort of mule-
animal, capable only of destroying, and not of breeding up. ",30 
It was the Enlightened Separationists who probably best represented the 
challenge to paternal authority that Wood has identified. Jefferson advo-
cated a clear separation of church and state in order to protect the integrity 
of the government.31 Madison shared this view, but also believed that relig-
ion benefitted from such a separation. 32 This divergence of underlying in-
tentions perhaps derived from the religious beliefs of each of these men at 
the time they were engaged in the debates and discussions leading to the 
drafting of the religion clause. Michael McConnell has noted that it is un-
clear what Madison's adult religious beliefs were, but that as a young man, 
he attended a Presbyterian college (princeton), rather than "the more natural 
course of study at the Anglican college, William and Mary.,,33 Jefferson, 
like Paine, was a deist who repudiated Christian doctrine while accepting the 
moral code of Christ. 34 Both Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, "went so far 
28. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 21-31. I have chosen to follow their catego-
ries. For another view, see Witte, supra note 8. Witte has articulated four perspectives: 
congregational Puritans, free church evangelicals (theological), enlightenment thinkers, 
and civic republicans (political). Id. at 377. And, as Witte notes, these categories are not 
in any way exhaustive of all the various influences, and frequently persons shifted from 
one category to another. Id. at 377-78. 
29. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 22-26. 
30. Witte, supra note 8, at 383-84 (citation omitted). 
31. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 24; CHOPER, supra note 7, at 3. Nonetheless, 
Jefferson negotiated treaties which provided federal monies for the Christianization of 
American Indians. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 29. 
32. See CHOPER, supra note 7, at 3; ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 25-26. 
33. McConnell, supra note 10, at 26. But see ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 25 
("Though distrustful of institutional religion he remained an Episcopalian throughout his 
life and maintained strong religious convictions.") 
34. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 22. 
.ii.1I4_AA_ 
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as to believe that the only thing worth keeping of the Christian faith was the 
Sermon on the Mount. ,,35 Unlike Madison, Jefferson refused to issue relig-
ious proclamations when President. 36 His stance derived from a strong be-
lief in the personal, and therefore private nature of religion. 37 Madison be-
lieved that religious freedom was an innate, God-given right, which was 
beyond the purview of the government. 38 However, he also believed that re-
ligious diversity, in and of itself, safeguarded religious liberty.39 
Madison ultimately defmed religion as a duty, determined by human 
beings. 
The obligations it entailed were to be interpreted by mankind and 
rested on individuals rather than on society, much less the state . . . 
'Spiritual tyranny,' built 'on the ruins of the civil authority,' 
emerged when its supporters mistakenly erected 'ecclesiastical es-
tablishments' that manipulated the authority of the state to coerce 
both religious and secular opinion. Throughout, Madison assumed 
the plurality of religion .... 40 
The Pietistic Separationists fall somewhere in between Adams and 
Emmerich's other two categories. Generally this group believes that the 
government's role in this area was to encourage a climate which would be 
favorable to voluntary religious devotion,41 a view generally advanced by 
persons belonging to dissenting religious groups. "This theologically 
grounded stance affIrmed that God has appointed two kinds of government 
. . . which are distinct in their nature and ought never to be confounded to-
gether. ,,42 One of the leading proponents of this position was Isaac 
Backus.43 
The view which perhaps most influenced the religion clause44 was that 
of the political centrists (Witte's "civic republicans"), exemplifIed by such 
men as John Adams and George Washington.45 These men all believed that 
religion was necessary for and vital to a democratic government. 46 Despite 
35. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 158. 
36. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 29. 
37. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 23. "It is important to remember that many 
believers in the separation of religion and government were primarily interested in protect-
ing religion from the state rather than vice-versa." SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 12. 
38. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 25. 
39. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 2. 
40. JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 263 
(1990) (citation omitted). 
41. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 29. 
42. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 
43. Id. at 29. Another proponent of this view was John Witherspoon, the only clergy-
man to sign the Declaration ofIndependence. Id. at 30. 
44. Id. at 26. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
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the defiance of the paternalistic structure that Wood has cited as a hallmark 
of American life in the Eighteenth Century, concurrently there was a rec-
ognition that American society was fragmented, and needed the cohesiveness 
that religion could provide.47 In the area of religion, the colonial challenge to 
"paternalist authority" concentrated on the established, monarchically re-
lated Church of England, not on organized religion itself (although manyen-
lightenment thinkers repudiated much of institutionalized Christianity),48 and 
most certainly not on Christianity. While the tendency of Protestantism to 
fragment was evident during this time,49 the new, unique experiment that 
was revolutionary America was one that nonetheless operated within fairly 
defined, clear parameters. Alexis De Tocqueville observed that "all of the 
sects of the United States are comprised within the great unity of Christian-
ity, and Christian morality is everywhere the same. ,,50 A white, Christian, 
land-and-slaveowning patriarchy set the absolute boundaries for the Ameri-
can revolution. Christianity generally and Protestantism specifically, was a 
unifying factor, "for religion was the way most common people still made 
meaningful the world around them.,,51 This religious landscape has domi-
nated the society and culture ever since. Gordon Wood has noted that with 
the democratization of the nation, came evangelization. 52 
"From the time of the Puritans to the present, the country has been 
viewed in missionary terms. . .. What Protestantism did was synthesize, 
from diverse sources, a view of man that it endowed with a religious mis-
sion.,,53 Despite their assertion of a "generic" religious/civil society, propo-
nents of "multiple establishments," clearly advocated an explicitly Christian 
47. The geographic distances, "surging popUlation and changing economic relationships 
unsettled traditional hierarchies .... " G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 144. Thus, there was a 
move away from the Church of England and a movement towards numerous other religious 
sects. "In these mid-century decades succeeding waves of enthusiastic New Light Presby-
terians, Separate Baptists, and finally Methodists swept up new converts .... " Id. 
48. "Jefferson hated orthodox clergymen, and he repeatedly denounced the 'priestcraft' 
for having converted Christianity into an 'engine for enslaving mankind' .... " Id. at 330. 
That Jefferson, a slaveholder, could somehow divorce the institution of slavery from the 
"enslaving" role of Christianity is but one of the many paradoxes of constitutional history. 
See supra note 7. 
49. "To some observers, 'Pennsylvania in 1750 was simply a chaos of sects,' and in 
North Carolina an Anglican missionary complained about the 'great number of dissenters 
of all denominations .... ' Religious proliferation was so extensive in Long Island, New 
York, that attempts to count denominations were meaningless because the number changed 
almost daily." FORREST WOOD, THE ARROOANCE OF FAITH: CHRISTIANITY AND RACE IN 
AMERICA FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 12-13 (1990) (citation 
omitted) [hereinafter F. WOOD]. 
50. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 314 (Phillips Bradley ed. & 
Henry Reeve trans., 1966). 
51. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 330. 
52. Id. at 331. "If the democratic revolution of the decades following the Declaration of 
Independence meant the rise of ordinary people, it meant as well the rise of popular evan-
gelical Christianity." Id. at 330. 
53. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 2. 
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version of America. 54 "Christianity, not just 'religion,' propelled mankind to 
better governments and just societies.,,55 
George Washington, while not particularly religious, nonetheless, be-
lieved in the benefits of religion for promoting order.56 John Adams, a po-
litical centrist, issued presidential religious proclamations which "urg[ ed] 
dependence on God as essential for the 'promotion of that morality and piety 
without which social happiness can not exist nor the blessings of a free gov-
ernment be enjoyed. ",57 The centrist position was the dominant one in the 
ideology of the Founding Fathers. 58 From the beginning of the jurisprudence 
of the Free Exercise Clause, it is this position that came to dominate the 
ideology and thinking of the courts. 59 A slightly different view of the origins 
and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause has been articulated by Vine De-
Loria, Jr., who noted: "'Religion' in the original sense of the Constitution 
means the various Christian denominations, whose members and clergy had 
been active in religious persecution in Europe and who might, given some 
authority, repeat their tyranny in America. The First Amendment was de-
signed to keep Christians from killing each other."6O One hundred years 
earlier, De Tocqueville expressed a somewhat similar sentiment: 
In the United States, the influence of religion is not confmed to the 
manners, but it extends to the intelligence of the' people. Among the 
Anglo-Americans some profess the doctrines of Christianity from a 
sincere belief in them, and others who do the same because they are 
54. In 1778, William Tennet, a Presbyterian minister complained to the South Carolina 
legislature that current laws favored the Church of England to the detriment of other 
Christian religions and violated both principles of religious liberty and equality. However, 
when he was told that the legislature was "considering a mUltiple establishment that might 
include many 'orthodox' Christian groups, including his own, he found a new meaning for 
equality. [Then] he supported the multiple establishment bill, because 'it opens the door 
to the equal incorporation of all denominations' and to a new, more creative relationship in 
which 'Christianity itselfis the established religion of the State. '" BUTLER, supra note 40, 
at 260 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
55. ld. at 264. The debate on Virginia'S "Bill Concerning Religion" was a touchstone 
for the various positions across the spectrum. 
56. ld. 
57. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 27 (citation omitted). 
58. ld. at 26. See for example, the Carroll family (devout Roman Catholics-then a 
"minority" religion among the Founding Fathers but which fell within the rubric of Chris-
tianity, the dominant religious ideology). Charles Carroll was a signer of the Declaration 
of Independence and was on the drafting committee of the First Amendment, and Daniel 
Carroll signed the Constitution and advocated religious freedom. ld. at 27. John Carroll 
became the first American Roman Catholic Bishop and urged toleration towards other 
Christians. ld. at 27 (emphasis added). 
59. Ironically, however, it has been noted that only about ten percent of "the generation 
which produced the Constitution" were church members (as contrasted with approximately 
two-thirds oftoday's popUlation). SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 2. 
60. VINE DELORIA, JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF 
SCIENTIFIC FACT 27 (1995). 
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afraid to be suspected of unbelief. Christianity, therefore, reigns to 
be without any obstacle, by universal consent; the consequence is, 
as I have before observed, that every principle of the moral world is 
fixed and determinate .... 61 
The influence of the centrists continues to dominate today and is mani-
fested in innumerable ways. What are often noted as typically American 
characteristics-strong individualism and the idea of free enterprise-it has 
been argued, are "nothing more than secular extensions of the Christian pre-
cepts of a personal relationship with Christ, man's dominion over the earth, 
and the bringing of Good News to all peoples.,,62 The dominance wielded by 
Christian ideology, specifically in Free Exercise jurisprudence, can be best 
understood by briefly examining the underlying canons of Christianity espe-
cially influential in the early history of this country. 
Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in. 
-St. Luke63 
Christianity, like many other religions before and since, has often fos-
tered the belief that it is the one "true" religion. However, that idea, coupled 
with two other important characteristics, have created a whole greater than 
its parts. The first of these two traits is the monotheistic nature of Christian 
religions. The second is the inherent evangelical component of Christian-
ity.64 When joined together these three components set the stage for the de-
velopment and nurturing of a political and social culture of conversion 
(voluntary or coerced), conformity, and, in many instances, intolerance, de-
spite the language of the First Amendment. Grounded in a monotheistic 
creed, the dogmatic belief in a one truth/one way, can and does result in a 
rejection of the possibility that an "other" religion or belief is at least as vi-
able or acceptable as Christianity.65 
Monotheism begins with the notion that no other gods exist. 66 This 
canon leads almost inevitably to rejection of other religions, which is not 
found in most other religious systems. The Baha'is, for example, stress 
61. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 50, at 295. 
62. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at xviii. This idea of dominion over the earth will be dis-
cussed later in this Article, as this view of human versus nature runs directly counter to 
earth-based, animistic beliefs. Such a view gets reflected in the jurisprudence of free ex-
ercise claims, where all or part of the basis of the claim is to protect nature. 
63. 14 Luke 23:14. 
64. "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Mark 15:16. 
65. Of course, Christianity is not the only religion susceptible to bouts of intolerance. 
Rather the point is simply that one views the underlying tenets of Christianity as inherently 
exclusive and exclusionary. 
66. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 17 (emphasis added). "Christian conviction, by defini-
tion, was based on an infallible authority; to challenge canons or dogmas with rational ar-
guments could be construed by true believers as heresy." Id. at 6. 
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ideas of brotherhood and generally accept the validity of all faiths, and Bud-
dhists generally do not see conflicts between most of their teachings and 
other religions.67 For Africans and Native Americans in early America, the 
Christian God that was presented to them was simply one deity, as feasible 
as any other. However, the reverse did not apply, especially because of the 
exclusionary nature of monotheism. Red Jacket, a Seneca chief, once asked 
a Christian missionary, "If there is but one religion, why do you white peo-
ple differ so much about it ?,,68 Furthermore, when the missionary aspect of 
Christianity is considered,69 the inevitable result is religious imperialism. 
The enslaved Africans brought to this continent, as well as the indigenous 
peoples already living here, learned this lesson better than anyone. 70 
From the earliest exploration of the "New World," a religious compo-
nent accompanied the economic incentives of "discovery" and conquest. 71 
The charters that King James granted to the Virginia companies in 1606 
explicitly required "propagating the Christian religion,,,72 and the charter for 
the Massachusetts Bay Company contained a comparable mandate to teach 
and convert the Indians. 73 Five other charters also contained missionary 
components.74 Significantly, the motivation and compulsion to convert, and 
thereby "uplift non-believers," could be traced as easily to those who pro-
fessed to do it out of love and compassion, as to those who feared and dis-
dained Indians and Africans.75 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 13 (citing DAVID T. BAILEY, SHADOW OF THE CHURCH 65 (1985». 
69. The historian Forrest Wood cites Christ's mandate, found in Matthew 28:19 ("to 
teach all nations") as one example that has been (and for some still remains) not only a 
justification, but in fact a requirement to evangelize others in the Christian religion. Id. at 
10. 
70. A thorough discussion of the extent of and damage to both peoples by conquest and 
evangelization is well beyond the scope of this paper. See BUTLER, supra note 40; F. 
WOOD, supra note 49. The latter book focuses specifically on the effects of Christianity on 
Africans. 
71. See Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence o/Christian Nationalism In Federal Indian 
Law: The Doctrine 0/ Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y. U. 
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 303 (1993). 
72. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 18. 
73. "Reviewing the charter ... King Charles considered the conversion of the heathen 
natives to Christianity to be 'the principall Ende of this plantacion. '" Id. 
74. The charters were for Maryland, Maine, Carolina, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. 
"[O]nly those for Connecticut (1662) and New York (1664 and 1674) were silent on the 
question of missions to the heathens." Id. at 19. However, Forrest Wood notes that the 
mandate in these charters to convert the Indians was often ignored or supplanted by the 
tendency simply to conquer· and dominate, which he asserts derived from a need to feel 
safe in the new surroundings. Id. at 19-20. A more likely interpretation, perhaps, was the 
expediency of conquest versus conversion. 
75. Quaker critics of slavery, such as Anthony Benezet, demonstrate this point. Benezet 
viewed Christianity as the means by which the Africans could overcome "the corruption of 
the human heart ... ," it being "the only hope for oppressed black people everywhere." Id. 
at 21. John Eliot and Cotton Mather both urged slaveholders to allow the conversion of 
their slaves, Eliot arguing that it was the owners' Christian duty to do so. LoRENZO 
ft 
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Thus, from the earliest days of this nation, an unassailable presumption 
of the absolute rightness, and therefore supremacy, of Christianity over other 
religions has existed. It is within this historical and cultural context that the 
jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause developed. 
PART II: THE ROADS NOT TAKEN 
Although time and experience have helped American jurisprudence inch 
forward somewhat, to a slightly more inclusive perspective, compulsory 
unification of opinion only achieves the unanimity of the graveyard.76 How-
ever, the framework of viewing religion has traditionally been and remains, 
albeit to a somewhat lesser degree, inexorably enmeshed in a Judeo-
Christian weltanschauung that inherently disadvantages those religions and 
religious beliefs outside that view. According to the Supreme Court, 
[n ]ational unity is the basis for national security. . .. The ultimate 
foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. 
Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and 
spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, 
transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that 
continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civiliza-
tion.77 
There has been some progression away from the explicit, "this is a 
Christian nation,,78 view articulated by Justice Brewer, but the march away 
from such a proclamation has been carried out with deliberate sluggishness. 
The destination, a more vibrant, meaningful, and inclusive view of religion 
that protects equally the free exercise rights of all, has yet to be reached. 
A. IN THE BEGINNING 
In the early cases, the issue of religion arose less in the area of free ex-
ercise than in areas such as bequests, oaths, and disposition of property. 79 
JOHNSTON GREENE, NEGROES IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 257,263,265 (1969) (discussing 
Mather's assertions that the Christian mandate to love one's neighbor extended to slaves). 
See also Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Ex-
emptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106, 1132 (1994). 
76. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). Three years 
after Gobitis, on virtually the same issue, the Court reversed itself, by a vote of 6-3. In the 
three years between the cases, Jehovah's Witnesses had been attacked by mobs all over the 
country. "The Court handed down its decision [in Gobitis] on June 3, 1940. Between 
June 12 and June 20, hundreds of physical attacks upon Witnesses were reported to the 
United States Department of Justice. BARBARA GRIWTTI HARRISON, VISIONS OF GLORY: A 
HISTORY AND A MEMORY OF JEROV AH'S WITNESSES 190 (1978). 
77. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940) (upholding the expul-
sion of two Jehovah's Witness children from public school and the subsequent arrest of 
their father for the children's failure to salute the flag). 
78. Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,471 (1892). 
79. A review of the earliest religion cases before the U.S. Supreme Court shows that the 
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Nonetheless, the stark and virtually unassailable notions of a monotheistic, 
distinct, Christian80 perspective run rampant. A number of assumptions un-
derlie any discussions of these cases. The starting point in almost any case 
where religion was an issue was that, of course, everyone was religious, 
followed closely by the assumption that the religion practiced was of Chris-
tian origin.81 While some of the language, in some of the discussions, ac-
knowledged the existence of religions other than Christianity, the overall ef-
fect equaled little more than lip service. Even in those cases with a "liberal" 
result, i.e., upholding some semblance of religious freedom, the underlying 
attitude was one of exclusion and noblesse oblige. A review of some of 
these early cases amply demonstrates these points. 
In People v. Ruggles,82 a New York court upheld a conviction of blas-
phemy, rejecting the defendant's argument that the crime was not punishable 
in that jurisdiction. The defendant had admitted that his words83 were pun-
ishable under English common law, but not under state law, because New 
York had not made Christianity part of its common law.84 The court re-
jected all of the defendant's arguments for several different, although inter-
connected, reasons. The words of the defendant, which had, according to the 
court, "scandalized" the "author of' Christianity, constituted a "gross viola-
tion of decency and good order,,,85 in addition to being impious.86 This in-
terplay between Christian religion and morality, the pervasive and eternal 
marriage of concepts in American life, was explicitly acknowledged by the 
court when it noted, "Nothing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of 
the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to 
declare such profanity lawful. It would go to confound all distinction be-
tween things sacred and profane. ,,87 The court went on to note that the de-
Court was almost exclusively dealing with property issues. See Carl H. Esbeck, Table of 
United States Supreme Court Decisions Relating to Religious Liberty 1789-1994, 10 J.L. 
& RELIGION 573 (1994). 
80. I use the word distinct here, because, to paraphrase Orwell, some Christian religions 
were more equal than others. Michael McConnell has identified several different ap-
proaches to the church-state relationship in colonial times. For example, one such attitude 
was developed by the Puritans, who rejected the idea of religious pluralism (toleration 
made the world anti-Christian). McConnell, supra note 10, at 1422. A second approach 
was that of the Anglicans. Such congregations were established by the Crown and were 
both financed and controlled by it. Id. at 1423. When non-Anglicans eventually ventured 
into these communities, they were met with opposition. Id. 
81. Of course, the opposite assumption was made as to "the others"-Indians and Afri-
cans. For the courts, it was axiomatic that both groups were not religious, that they did not 
believe in a Christian god, which was, for the courts, the same thing. 
82. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (1811). 
83. The charge against the defendant was that he had "wickedly, maliciously and blas-
phemously" said, "in the presence and hearing of divers good and christian people," sev-
eral highly derogatory remarks about Christ and his mother. Id. 
84. Id. at 293-94. 
85. Id. at 293. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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fendant's words also clearly went against the religion and religious beliefs of 
"almost the whole community,,,88 and were, therefore, an abuse of the right 
to a "free, equal and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion. ,,89 The 
opinion was an absolute rejection of two principles typically thought to be 
held dear in American jurisprudence and American life: the right to free 
speech and the right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs. But the right 
to believe, under the Ruggles analysis, is permissible only as long as the 
"non-believer" says or does nothing that offends the majority, a hollow right 
indeed.9O This interpretation is not an exaggeration of the reasoning, as the 
court went on to make clear, that non-Christian religions were not equally 
protected. 
Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution, as some 
have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish in-
discriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of 
the Grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes 
that we are a christian people, and the morality of the country is 
deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon doctrines or wor-
ship of those impostors. Besides, the offense is crimen malitioe, and 
the imputation of malice could not be inferred from any invectives 
upon superstitions equally false and unknown.91 
It was only the elevated moral sense of Christians, then, that would be pro-
tected,92 at least under the New York court's analysis. 
Finally, the court held that although the Constitution was religion-free, it 
did not automatically follow that common law "barriers against licentious, 
wanton and impious attacks upon christianity',93 had been abandoned. In 
doing so, it also found that certain Christian values had clearly been incor-
porated into the law, citing a statute against immorality which recognized 
the sanctity of the sabbath day, clearly a principle founded in Christian doc-
trine. 94 Thus, the court upheld the blasphemy charge as going against the 
morality, religious beliefs, and common law of the community, essentially 
asserting that the three were one and the same. This last point is perhaps the 
most telling for what it reveals. Despite a state, or indeed, a federal consti-
tution that had sound historical reasons for both attempting to protect relig-
88. [d. at 294. 
89. [d. 
90. This is, of course, an anathema to the principles articulated by people such as Jeffer-
son, Franklin and Paine. See generally ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7, at 21-31. 
91. Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 293. 
92. "It is sufficient that the common law checks upon words and actions, dangerous to 
the public welfare, ... are suited to the conditions of this and every other people whose 
manners are refined, and whose morals have been elevated and inspired with a more en-
larged benevolence, by means of the Christian religion." [d. at 293. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 297. 
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ious liberty, and preventing the establishment of anyone religion over an-
other, courts often act on what they assert constitutes the common thread of 
"the community": its mores, standards and beliefs. However, the commu-
nity, more often than not, is defmed by those very same courts, and typically 
means "others like me." This reasoning, which is implicitly if not explicitly 
reflected in the case law, is circular. Although a court generally states that 
its reasoning and opinion is simply reflecting a communal "agreement" as to 
morality and beliefs, it is instead defining and limiting that community. It 
does so by selecting those values, morals, and beliefs that it has decided are 
the ones that represent the totality of the community. In doing so, it inher-
ently ignores, and therefore excludes, all others. Consciously or not, the 
world reflected, discussed and upheld is a narrow one not genuinely reflec-
tive of the larger society. This was as true in 1811 New York as it is today. 
In 1844, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Vidal v. Gi-
rard's Executors,95 had one of its fIrst opportunities to consider the question 
of religion, albeit not on a specifIc First Amendment issue. Vidal concerned 
a bequest to the City of Philadelphia that sought to establish a college for 
orphans. 96 A critical issue in the bequest, however, was the following lan-
guage: 
Secondly, I enjoin and require that no ecclesiastic, missionary, or 
minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any sta-
tion or duty whatever in the said college; nor shall any person ever 
be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within the premises ap-
propriated to the purposes of the said college.97 
One of the arguments made in the challenge to the will was that such a 
request was "antichristian. ,,98 As such, it was argued, the will violated 
Pennsylvania law.99 However, the Court upheld the will, including the 
"antichristian" aspect of the bequest. loo The Court fIrst noted that Girard's 
clear intention in making his bequest was to help "the orphan poor of all 
sects, Jews as well as Christians, and those who had no religion at all.,,101 
However, the Court's comfort with that broad-based intent seemed to rest 
95. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127 (1844). There were a number of other 
cases heard by the Court, but the religious "question" was not as central to the case, and 
will therefore not be discussed here. See e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 
(1815) (state prohibited from expropriating property of Episcopal Church); Permoli v. First 
Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) (Bill of Rights not a protection for state citi-
zens); Goesele v. Bimeler, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 589 (1852) (heirs' recovery of property from 
Society of Separatists). Esbeck, supra note 79, at 1. 
96. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127 (1844). 
97. Id. at 132. 
98. Id. at 143. There were other grounds for challenging the will not relevant to this 
discussion. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 153. 
101. Id. 
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less on an open-armed embrace of "all," than on an underlying assumption 
that the Court appeared to superimpose onto Girard's bequest. First, the 
Court acknowledged the difficulty of furthering the goals espoused in the de-
ceased's will, in particular the fostering of morality, if the college were to 
specifically establish or require only one religious perspective. 102 But then, 
in an approach which seems to mimic that of the Ruggles court, the Vidal 
court held that "morality" could have only one possible definition and origin. 
The Court, in discussing this question, said: 
The purest principles of morality are to be taught. Where are they 
found? Whoever searches for them must go to the source from 
which a Christian man derives his faith-the Bible. It is therefore 
affrrmatively recommended, and in such a way as to preserve the 
sacred rights of conscience. No one can say that Girard was a de-
ist. 103 
The Court's comfort with Girard's bequest derived from the absolute 
certainty that "morality" was virtually interchangeable with Christian doc-
trine, not from an acceptance of a potentially "antichristian" bequest. This 
perspective is equally reflected in Holy Trinity Church v. United States. 104 
Holy Trinity is, of course, where the Supreme Court declared, "We are a 
Christian people. ,,105 There, the Court would not concede that a statute 
which prohibited the importation of labor could, in any way, have been 
meant to apply to a clergyman. While the Court first discussed religion in 
102. Id. "Girard did what was in conformity with law, and often done practically. He 
had to abandon his scheme or prevent discord by adopting the plan which he followed." 
Id. 
103. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added). There is an obvious irony in reading the almost 
palpable scorn with which the Court used the term deist, forgetting, of course, that Thomas 
Jefferson, for example, a man vital to the life of the Constitution, was one. This change in 
attitude, a dogmatism regarding religion, contributed to the despair experienced by men 
such as John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson, at the end of their lives. 
John Adams, like Thomas Jefferson, bemoaned the religious revivals which the country 
was experiencing in the very late 1700s and early 1800s. "Superstition and bigotry, with 
which Jefferson identified organized religion, were reviving, released by the democratic 
revolution he had led." G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 367. John Adams asked: "Where is 
now, the progress of the human Mind? ... When? Where? and How? is the present Chaos 
to be arranged into Order?" Id. at 366-67. Alexander Hamilton noted, "[t]his American 
world was not made for me." Id. at 367. Vidal, in its assumptions about the unquestioned 
"rightness" of Christianity and Christian morality, exemplified the change in American life 
that took place in less than a hundred years. 
104. Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
105. Id. at 471. The case arose from a challenge to an anti-immigrant statute, which 
prohibited the importation of foreign labor. Id. at 463. Holy Trinity, in New York City, 
had contracted with an English clergyman to come and serve as its pastor. Id. at 458. The 
government sought to exclude the minister under the statute, and the Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court's upholding of the exclusion. The Court's opinion generally reflects 
a xenophobia and anti-laborer stance which is also supported in the legislative history of 
the Act. See id. at 464-66. 
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general terms, ("this is a religious people"),I06 the bulk of the case makes 
clear that, for the Court (presumably speaking for "the people" generally),107 
religion and Christianity are one and the same. 108 
The presumption of unanimity of belief is also reflected in Church of 
Latter Day Saints v. United States,t09 one of several early cases involving 
the Mormon Church. In Latter Day Saints, the question was the validity of 
Congress's revocation of the charter of the Mormon Church, as well as the 
forfeiture of church property. The Court upheld the revocation as being 
within the powers of Congress. 110 In the context of discussing the disposi-
tion of Church property, the Court examined the corporation which held ti-
tle. It noted that the purposes of the corporation focused on spreading the 
doctrines of the Mormon Church, including. The Court's discussion of this 
practice is filled with scorn and revulsion. It called polygamy "abhorrent to 
the sentiments and feelings of the civilized world . . . " and a "barbarous 
practice" which was "a blot on our civilization." 11 I So although Mormonism 
is Christian in origin, in the early days of its existence it was sufficiently 
"distinctive" from other Christian religions (in the view of the Court) to jus-
tify numerous rulings against the Church as an institution, as well as against 
early religious practices, specifically polygamy. I 12 
While the "anti-Mormon" cases would appear, on their face, to contra-
dict the thesis of this Article, i.e., that courts generally support Christian re-
ligious claims and go against non-Christian belief systems or ways of life, in 
fact the opposite is true. Courts' early biases against the Mormons were 
centered upon an absolute rejection of the practice o(polygamy: "a return 
to barbarism," as the Court described it in Church of Latter Day Saints. 113 
106. Id. at 465. 
107. After reviewing numerous state constitutions, the Court declared: "There is no dis-
sonance in these declaration ... , These are not individual sayings, declarations of private 
persons. They are organic utterances. They speak the voice 0/ the entire people." Id. at 
470 (emphasis added). 
108. In hypothesizing about an Act that would have specifically excluded a church from 
contracting with a clergyman to come to this country, the Court does include a synagogue 
and rabbi in its speCUlative fact pattern. Id. at 472. Overall, however, the Court generally 
exhibits a decidedly Christian bent throughout the case. 
109. Church of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. I (1890). 
110. Id. at 62,65. 
Ill. Id. at 48-49. In the opinion, the Court almost visibly recoils at the term polygamy. 
Whatever one thinks about the practice of polygamy, it hardly seems equal to the response 
it elicited from the Court in this case, or in others, or from the government, generally. It is 
one thing to hold a certain practice illegal, or even simply unprotected by the law; it is an-
other to treat it as if it is a manifestation of all that is evil and wrong in the world. 
112. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding conviction of 
polygamy where a requested jury instruction regarding polygamy as protected religious be-
lief was rejected); Davis v. Beeson, 133 U.S. 333 (1889) (affirming guilty verdict for man 
who, as member of Mormon Church, violated voter registration oath which required rejec-
tion of bigamy or polygamy). 
113. Church o/Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 49. 
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The Court there added: "It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity, and of 
the civilization which Christianity has produced in the western world. ,,114 
Kurt Lash has noted that the impetus behind a bill to punish and prevent the 
practice of polygamy emanated from the idea that "it was a direct affront to 
the religious beliefs of the majority. ,,115 This is consistent with a literalist 
view of monotheism which, as discussed above, requires a rejection of the 
"other." That does not, as these cases demonstrate, simply mean a rejection 
of other gods, but other beliefs, ideas and practices different from or incon-
sistent with a very clearly delineated view of Christianity. That view, al-
ready on display in the Mormon cases, takes on an equally narrow, and even 
greater exclusionary bent in Native American and other animist, earth-based 
contexts. 
B. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE STREET 
If the courts were specifically setting out the inherent Christian charac-
ter of the United States, they were also implicitly, when not explicitly, sanc-
tioning the dismantling of various non-Christian religions. This is best evi-
denced by examining the treatment of the two groups of peoples most 
profoundly affected by the Christianization that took place in early America: 
the Africans brought to the United States in the slave trade and Native 
Americans. 
1. The Africans 
The religious status of Africans brought to the United States in the earli-
est days of this country was complicated by "that peculiar institution." The 
Puritans thought, for example, that slavery was "a means of bringing the 
heathen to ChriSt.,,1l6 Slavery was originally justified in part by a bias 
against "heathens" and unbelievers. 117 Although eventually that general bias 
transformed into a specific bias against race, which made it easier to justify 
the practice, for a long while the institution of slavery posed a dilemma for 
Christian slaveowners. 118 How could one reconcile one's own Christian be-
liefs, and the mandate to bring the opportunity of salvation through conver-
sion to the heathens, while maintaining the institution of slavery? In the 
early days of colonialism and slavery, conversion of slaves was discouraged, 
in part on economic grounds. 119 There was an inherent contradiction in both 
114. Id. (emphasis added). 
115. Lash, supra note 75, at 1124. 
116. GREENE, supra note 75, at 257. 
117. BUTLER, supra note 40, at 129. 
118. Id. at 129. 
119. GREENE, supra note 75, at 257-58. "Many owners feared conversion might lessen 
the value of their chattels as laborers. Not only would valuable time be lost in instructing 
them, but, once converted, the Negroes would be compelled to attend church on Sunday. 
Prohibition of Sunday work by the slaves would increase maintenance costs, for in the 
plantation colonies, especially, the slaves raised part of their food on that day." [d. at 258 
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baptizing and admitting Africans into white churches, while simultaneously 
enslaving them. 120 Slaveowners feared that Christian concepts of equality 
would plant dangerous ideas in slaves' minds. They also feared that since 
only heathens could be enslaved, conversion would eliminate a critical justi-
fication for slavery. 121 That incongruity was most often dealt with by ensur-
ing legislatively that baptism did not confer manumission. 122 F or example, 
six colonies passed such laws in the late seventeenth century through the 
beginning of the eighteenth century.123 
In New England, there was less resistance to the idea of converting 
slaves than in the South, in part due to efforts by the British "to spread the 
Protestant faith by competing with the Catholics in the conversion of Indians 
and Negroes.,,124 Cotton Mather became an ardent advocate of Christianiz-
ing slaves, reconciling their conversion with the maintenance of the system 
of slavery by noting: "What law is it, that sets the baptized slave at liberty? 
Not the law o!Christianity.,,125 The Quakers, many of whom owned slaves 
until 1773, when they forbade members from doing so, also favored Christi-
anization of slaves. 126 These motivations and ideas took on even greater 
momentum with the coming of the first Great Awakening, which spread a 
religious fervor throughout the colonies. 127 
What ultimately occurred then, as historian Jon Butler has noted, was a 
parallel growth in both Christianity and slavery in the colonies after 1680.128 
That expansion of Christianity and slavery in the colonies led to what Butler 
classifies as "the single most important religious transformation to occur in 
the American colonies before 1776: an African spiritual holocaust that for-
ever destroyed traditional African religious systems as systems in North 
America and that left slaves remarkably bereft of traditional collective relig-
(citation omitted). 
120. GEORGE EATON SIMPSON, BLACK RELIGIONS IN THE NEW WORLD 213 (1978). It was 
also true, however, that white slaveowners had a tremendous fear of the Africans congre-
gating in their own churches, in a group setting not absolutely controlled by the slave-
owner. [d. at 214. This led to numerous acts being passed which forbid owners from al-
lowing "any Negro or Negroes to build on their ... lands ... any house under pretense of 
a meetinghouse upon account of worship .... " [d. (citation omitted). See also GLADYS-
MARIE FRY, NIGHT RIDERS IN BLACK FOLK HISTORY 38-58 (1991). 
121. GREENE, supra note 75, at 259. 
122. SIMPSON, supra note 120, at 213. 
123. GREENE, supra note 75, at 260. Those colonies were Maryland, Virginia, New 
York, New Jersey, North and South Carolina. Id. 
124. Id. at 262-63. 
125. Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
126. Id. at 275. 
127. GREENE, supra note 75, at 276. See also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 7 
(citation omitted). 
128. BUTLER, supra note 40, at 149-50. He notes that while slavery existed in the colo-
nies existed prior to 1680, it was not until that time that slavery became a viable economic 
force. !d. at 130. 
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ious practice before 1760.,,129 This was fueled in part by the overwhelming 
success of Protestant Christianity in converting slaves, as opposed to num-
bers of Africans converted to Catholicism in the colonies. 130 This was im-
portant because, as has been shown in studies of slave experiences in Brazil 
and the Caribbean, Spanish-enforced Catholic conversions did not eradicate 
African religious traditions and beliefs in the same way that Protestant con-
versions did. 131 The North American, predominantly Protestant, evangeliza-
tion of slaves had a devastating effect on African spiritual traditions. 132 This 
was furthered by an insidious strategy devised by slave owners as a means 
of slave control. Slave owners created and spread stories of the supernatural 
that drew on, and were extrapolated from certain African beliefs. They 
played on fears of conjuring and witchcraft for one purpose: "to discourage 
the unauthorized movement of Blacks, especially at night. 133 It was used 
during slavery to prevent insurrections by discouraging the assembly of 
Blacks. . .. ,,134 
The spiritual holocaust against Africans gave rise to a somewhat pecu-
liar relationship between Christianity and slavery. That is, Christian tenets 
and Biblical mandates were used both as support for and opposition to slav-
ery.135 However, it should be noted that by the early nineteenth century, fear 
129. BUTLER, supra note 40, at 129-30. 
130. See generally GREENE, supra note 75, at 268. 
131. JOSEPH M. MURPHY, SANTERiA: AN AFRICAN RELIGION IN AMERICA 27-33 (1988). 
The reasons for more of a "survival" of African spiritual beliefs and practices under Span-
ish conversions had to do, in part, with the easily drawn analogies between Catholic saints 
and their mythologies, for example, and various African deities who appeared to have 
comparable characteristics. See F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 7-8 (citation omitted); MIGENE 
GoNZALEZ-WIPPLER, SANTERiA: AFRICAN MAGIC IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (1981). 
132. This is not to suggest, however, that African beliefs and traditions did not, and have 
not survived. See generally AFRlCANISMS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Joseph E. Hollowayed., 
1991). But a greater or more extensive preservation of African religious traditions and 
practices occurred under Spanish Catholic rule than under Anglo-American Protestant rule. 
133. One of the more devious manifestations of this strategy was the designation of the 
Indian as a "devil figure." FRY, supra note 120, at 50. As Fry notes, this had particular 
significance in the Eastern colonies, " ... arising mainly from the problem of troublesome 
communities of runaway slaves who had settled in uninhabited areas of Southern states 
and the fear of possible conspiracies between Indians and Blacks against whites. To fore-
stall such cooperative efforts between these two groups, the whites adopted a policy of di-
vide and conquer, in which Indians and Blacks were played off against each other. . .. " 
Id. 
134. Id. at 45. She notes that this method of control survived post-emancipation and was 
used to keep Blacks from fleeing the rural South for the cities in the North. Id. 
135. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at 39-83. "Religion, therefore, was largely employed as a 
device for making the slave content and submissive by his bondage. . .. This interpreta-
tion was first inculcated by Cotton Mather ... Mather's precepts set a precedent for using 
the religious indoctrination of the slaves as a subtle device for slave control. . .. " 
GREENE, supra note 75, at 286. It should not have come as much of a surprise, then, when 
Alabama State Senator Charles Davidson distributed a written copy of a speech recently, 
which cited Biblical support for slavery. Indeed, not only did his speech cite several spe-
cific Biblical references, Davidson went on to assert that a benefit of slavery was that 
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of slave uprisings came to outweigh any sense of obligation regarding 
Christian instruction. 136 Such instruction was seen as fomenting "self-
assertive tendencies.,,137 Nonetheless, conversion had already taken hold al-
most systematically throughout the African population, with its effects last-
ing through the present day. This may explain why, generally speaking, free 
exercise claims of non-Judeo-Christian religions arise largely, but not ex-
clusively, in the context of Native American religious beliefs rather than in 
the context of African religious traditions. 138 
The indelible transformation of the spiritual traditions and beliefs of the 
African populations in early America did not occur in the same way, nor to 
the same effect in the indigenous populations. Christianity came later in 
time to many Native Americans and lasted longer (the missionizing and gov-
ernment prohibitions against Indian religious practices continued through the 
latter part of the nineteenth century).139 Unlike the slave populations, Indi-
ans were much more geographically dispersed across this continent. As 
such, different measures were required for the forced conversions of Native 
Americans. 140 
Blacks got converted to Christianity. '''I'm sure that those converted black Southerners are 
most grateful today,' he wrote." ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 10, 1996, at Cll. 
136. In 1800, there was the Gabriel conspiracy, in 1822, Denmark Vesey's aborted at-
tempt at an uprising; and in 1831, the Nat Turner rebellion. FRY, supra note 120, at 39-
40. Ironically, all three men, especially Nat Turner, were devout Christians. "Vesey was 
also a devoted student of the Bible and frequently quoted passages from it to support his 
argument that slavery was contrary to the laws of God .... " Id. at 42. 
137. Id. at 43. 
138. Of course, Church of Lukumi Babalu-Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993) is one of several exceptions, as is Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N. Y. 
1994), where inmates, practitioners of Santeria were prohibited from wearing Orisa beads. 
Their beads had been confiscated by prison officials and they sought a return of the beads 
and the right to wear them. The court granted the plaintiffs' injunction on free exercise 
grounds. Campos, 854 F. Supp. at 197. See also Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568 
(S.D.N. Y. 1995), where Rastafarian correctional officers sought protection from regula-
tions which would have required them to cut their dreadlocks. They argued that both the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and state and federal free exercise claims guaranteed 
them the right to refrain from cutting their hair. The federal district court denied the de-
fendants' motions for summary judgment. Id. at 580. 
139. See Russell Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedomfor Indigenous Americans, 65 
OR. L. REv. 363, 369-74 (1986). Barsh notes that in 1882, dances and feasts were sup-
pressed. Id. at 370. In 1884, violations of that policy resulted in imprisonment. Id. at 370 
n.44 (citing U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, DEP'T OF INTERIOR REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN DEP'T 
496-97 (1884), which also punished "holding oneself out as a 'medicine-man "'). 
140. NATIVE AMERICANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (Fremont J. Lyden & Lyman H. Letgers 
eds., 1992). I wish to note here that this Article cannot, and does not pretend to do justice 
to the stories of either the Africans brought to this continent as slaves, or the Native 
American settler history and experiences, or American expansionism. I merely seek, here, 
to introduce some basic historical experiences as a necessary component to discussing, in 
context, the difficulties of applying a Judeo-Christian framework to non-monotheistic be-
lief systems. That must, and does, include characteristics and values that emanate from 
those differing belief systems. Such values manifest in numerous ways including, as I ar-
gue throughout this Article, in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause. 
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2. Native Americans 
The motivation for the Christianization of Native Americans rested, in 
part, on the general view that Indians, like African slaves, were "heathens" 
and Christian dogma required evangelization. 141 However, the overriding 
American demand and passion for the ownership and exclusive control of 
land had as much or more to do with efforts to Christianize Native Ameri-
cans than did purely ethnocentric notions of superiority.142 This demand 
grew greater by the beginning of the nineteenth century and led to the 
"Removal Era." Within that era, the movement to convert and "uplift" the 
Indians took on greater momentum. 
The assimiliationist movement grew in tandem with the policy of 
removal. Thomas Jefferson was one of the major supporters of the 
view that with adequate resources and coaxing Indians could be 
"civilized" and live in harmony with their white neighbors. . .. In-
dians were seen as being "historically anterior and morally inferior" 
to Protestant Christian settlers, and with expectations of their de-
mise as a people, there was pressure to civilize and Christianize 
them before it was too late. 143 
Thus, the government created the Civilization Fund, whereby Congress 
established an annual appropriation, the sole purpose of which was to fund 
missionary efforts for Christianizing the Indians. l44 Government support for 
and American policy regarding the Christianization of Indians, however, be-
gan before the Civilization Fund of 1819. F or example, George Washing-
ton, in his Third Annual Message in 1791, articulates the necessary elements 
of an Indian policy, stating that a "system corresponding with the mild prin-
ciples of religion and philanthropy toward an unenlightened race of men, 
whose happiness materially depends on the conduct of the United States, 
would be as honorable to the national character as conformable to the dic-
tates of sound policy.,,145 These notions of bringing "enlightenment" to the 
141. For a discussion of the idea of evangelization as an inherent component of Christian 
tenets, see supra notes 52-54, 64 and accompanying text. 
142. The desire and demand for more and more land generally superseded all other inter-
ests vis a vis the Indians. The numerous Indian Removal Acts best exemplifY this lust. 
See, e.g., MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT MONROE ON INDIAN REMOVAL (1825); reprinted in 
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, DocUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 39 (2d ed. 1990). 
See also SECRETARY OF WAR EATON ON CHEROKEE REMOVAL (1829), reprinted in PRUCHA, 
supra at 44; PRESIDENT JACKSON ON INDIAN REMOVAL 47 (1829), reprinted in PRUCHA, su-
pra at 47; THE INDIAN REMOVAL ACT OF 1830, reprinted in PRUCHA, supra at 52. 
143. PRUCHA, supra note 142, at 20. 
144. Id. "Be it enacted . .. , [t]hat for the purpose of providing against the further de-
cline and final extinction of the Indian tribes, . . . and for introducing among them the 
habits and arts of civilization .... " CIVILIZATION FUND ACT (1819), reprinted in Prucha, 
supra note 142, at 33. 
145. PRESIDENT WASlllNGTON'S THIRD ANNuAL MESSAGE, reprinted in PRUCHA, supra 
note 142, at 15. 
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non-Christians continued through the nineteenth century, as Indian Com-
missioner Hiram Price's Annual Report of 1882 indicates: 
One very important auxiliary in transforming men from savage to 
civilized life is the influence brought to bear upon them through the 
labors of Christian men and women as educators and missionaries. 
This, I think, has been forcibly illustrated and clearly demonstrated 
among the different Indian tribes by the missionary labors of the 
various religious societies in the last few years. Civilization is a 
plant of exceedingly slow growth, unless supplemented by Christian 
teaching and influences. . .. If we expect to stop sun dances, snake 
worship, and other debasing forms of superstition and idolatry 
among Indians, we must teach them some better way. 146 
As in earlier times, the belief that Christianization was the only means of 
civilization147 and progress was shared and propagated by both anti-Indian 
officials, such as Andrew Jackson, and reformers. Some of these reformers 
met annually between 1883 and 1916, and were influential in the creation of 
federal policy towards Indians. In a report from their 1884 meeting, the re-
formers noted how critical education (which for Indians generally meant 
mission schools) was to this process: 
Resolved, That education is essential to civilization . . .. [The In-
dian] must have a Christian education to enable him to perform the 
duties of the family, the State, and the Church. Such an education 
can be best acquired apart from his reservation and amid the influ-
ences of Christian and civilized society . .. The Christian people of 
the country should exert through the Indian schools a strong and 
moral and religious influence.148 
These ideas and policies continued well into the twentieth century. In 
the 1920s, for example, the United States government continued to ban any 
Indian dances or feasts, and Indian children were forcibly removed from 
their families and sent to boarding schools, where church service was man-
datory.149 The official right to religious "freedom" did not come until 
1978.150 
146. ANNUAL REpORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1992), reprinted in 
PRUCHA, supra note 142, at 157-59. Prucha notes that Indian Commissioner Price was a 
noted Methodist layman. [d. at 157. 
147. The writings and discussions regarding "civilizing the heathen" (African or Indian) 
remind me of graffiti I saw long ago, painted on the side of a building in New York City. 
It read: "Q: Mr. Gandhi, what do you think of Western civilization?" Gandhi: "I think it 
would be a good idea." 
148. PROGRAM OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE (1884), reprinted in PRUCHA, supra 
note 142, at 163-64. 
149. Barsh, supra note 139, at 371. 
150. 42 U.S.c. § 1996 (1978). 
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What this cursory review of American policy towards Africans and In-
dians makes clear is that there was a persistent ideological assumption that 
Christianity, both as a religion and a culture, was superior to all other vari-
ous and disparate religions, and was the only acceptable foundation for a 
uniform, American culture. It followed, therefore, that there should be one, 
homogenous American culture ("the melting pot"), to the virtual exclusion 
of all else, especially to that which did not have European, Judeo-Christian 
origins. 
C. WEAREALLRELATED151 
Christians believe that God is separate from humanity and does as 
he wishes without the creative assistance of any of his creatures, 
while the non-Christian tribal person assumes a place in creation 
that is dynamic, creative, and responsive. Further, tribal people al-
low all animals, vegetables, and minerals... the same or even 
greater privileges than humans. The Indian participates in destiny 
on all levels, including that of creation .... [E]ven the All Spirit. .. 
has limited power as well as a sense of proportion and respect for 
the powers of the creatures. Contrast this spirit with the Judeo-
Christian God, who makes everything and tells everything how it 
may and may not function if it is to gain his respect and 
bl ' 152 essmg .... 
A meaningful discussion of Native American and other earth-based re-
ligions153 and practices is immediately complicated not merely by semantics, 
but by a view of life154 that encompasses not one's place in the universe, but 
151. "'We are all related' is a statement of profound implications made by each Lakota 
after he or she has smoked a sacred pipe in common and in communion." JOSEPH E. 
BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 13 (1982). 
152. PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN 
INDIAN TRADITIONS 56-57 (1986). 
153. I recognize that I am engaging in generalizations here and in other sections of this 
Article about an "Indian" or "earth-based" religion, as if there were one. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the inherent individual co-relationship between a person and all other living beings 
(who are defined very broadly) that lies at the root of such religious beliefs. However, in 
order to discuss the thread of bias in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause, I feel 
compelled to use this "shorthand" terminology. But I should not be understood to suggest 
that there is one such religion. Many people who practice Santeria, for example, are also 
practicing Catholics. The pervasiveness of Christian missionizing among Indians has had 
an effect on Indians and Indian religions as well. Many Indians, for example, may pray 
with a sacred pipe and be practicing Christians. There is nothing inherently problematic 
with that. Black Elk, the great Lakota holy man, was a Christian. THOMAS E. MAILS, 
FOOLS CROW 45 (1979). It is the flexibility of these earth based religions ("all roads are 
good") that allows for this, while monotheism generally rejects it. 
154. "American Indian thought makes no such dualistic division, nor does it draw a hard 
and fast line between what is material and what is spiritual, for it regards the two as dif-
ferent expressions of the same reality." ALLEN, supra note 152, at 60. 
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one's place with and as a part of the universe. 155 That is a markedly differ-
ent perspective than a religious ideology that places people above nature. 
"That which we refer to in current usage as 'religion' cannot be conceived as 
being separable from any of the multiple aspects of any American Indian 
culture." I 56 This is a fundamental divergence from religious beliefs which 
compartmentalize people, animals and nature as separate entities within a 
specified hierarchical order. 
How you live life is both an art and a religion, as is how you treat 
and respect the environment-including animals, plants and fellow 
humans--alllife forms, even our Mother Earth. We see no need to 
create concepts to separate or fragment our daily lives. You need 
not have to go to church and pray when your home and environment 
are your church, your place of prayers. Try to live a clean, beauti-
ful, good, and balanced life. Be generous and caring. That's what 
our elders tell us. 
-Conrad Housel57 
The persistent use and application of traditionally Judeo-Christian 
theoiogical I58 terms to such beliefs and concepts perpetuates a system that 
will not comprehend "the other" and therefore results in the denial of relig-
ious freedom for entire ways of being. As Joseph Epes Brown has ex-
plained, when viewed from within a monotheistic religious perspective, there 
are only two, mutually exclusive variations; religions are either monotheistic 
or they are polytheistic. I59 This is inherently wrong~ he argues, because 
"primitive religions" (Brown's term), such as Indian religious traditions, do 
not fall into this explicit duality. He asserts that instead, such religions ac-
tually fall into a general category of theism that draws on both. 160 This dual-
155. This is also true of other "earth-based," "polytheistic," "animistic" "belief systems," 
such as Candomble or Santeria, for example. I use quotation marks around these words, 
because this terminology, I believe, does not do justice to the beliefs and knowledge these 
religions encompass. Rather, they are terms that are derived from a language which ema-
nates from Judeo-Christian perspectives. Perhaps it is in the recognition of such limita-
tions that a seed of change is planted. 
156. BROWN, supra note 151, at 2. 
157. ALL ROADS ARE GooD, supra note 1, at 91. 
158. My language here is somewhat awkward, but words and ideas grounded in theology 
do not work well when taken outside of their Judeo-Christian context. Of course, that is 
exactly what has almost always occurred in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause, 
and is the point of this Article. Words reflect concepts, and therefore the choice of words 
carries tremendous weight and influence. Furthermore, he/she who gets to choose the 
words gets to define and control both the discussion and the results. 
159. BROWN, supra note 151, at 69-70. Brown has also noted that monotheism is the one 
generally recognized as a sign of progress and civilization. Id. 
160. Id. at 70. For example, he cites the Lakota and Dakota of the Plains, for whom 
"Wakan-Tanka, Great Mysterious, is an all-inclusive concept that refers both to a Supreme 
Being and to the totality of all gods or spirits or powers of creation." Id. (emphasis 
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istic view is a far cry from a cultural view that, more often than not, tends to 
see things as an either/or proposition. 
One must resist the tendency to think of non-Christian religions as 
simply faiths in which people worship other deities or apotheosize 
different messengers. The theologies and eschatologies of Native 
American, African, and Eastern religions are so fundamentally dif-
ferent from the Judeo-Christian belief system that the word 
"religion" often seems inadequate to identify them ... how poorly 
the word "religion" describes the beliefs of other peoples when we 
try to understand them according to the monotheistic model. .... 161 
Rather, one must move away from a linear perspective to a circular one, 
in order to better understand how both earth based religious perspectives dif-
fer, and how they inform every aspect of one's life. The circle is "cyclical 
and reciprocal.,,162 In order to draw a representational figure of a hierarchi-
cal relationship, one must use straight lines. But it is not possible to draw a 
hierarchy by using a circle. Herein lies a critical difference in the perspec-
tives I am discussing, and this conflict is reflected in the realm of free exer-
cise law. 
There are three essential points of conflict between Judeo-Christian 
theological perspectives and earth-based ones. It is critical to identify and 
describe them in order to recognize how they impact a court's examination 
of a free exercise claim arising from a religion outside of the Judeo-Christian 
model. Anyone of these differences plays a role in the skewed jurisprudence 
of the Free Exercise Clause. However, when they are synthesized, as they 
tend to be, the legal analysis that follows is inherently slanted in an exclu-
sionary way. 
The first tension arises from the significance and value given to the 
written word in Judeo-Christian religions, as opposed to religions that rely 
on oral traditions. 163 The second point of departure is the view and role of 
added). 
161. F. WOOD, supra note 49, at xxi. 
162. BROWN, supra note 151, at 4. As Brown notes, this circular perspective pervades 
every aspect of life for Indians. In Santeria, there are comparable concepts. "The /fa 
Creation myth teaches that all form (ire) was placed in the universe at the beginning of 
time. The primal Spirit that sustains form as an element of Creation is Olodumare .... 
Olodumare is similar to the Western theological concept known as pantheism; the belief 
that everything in the physical universe is an expression of Deity." Awo FALOKUN 
FATUNMBI, IWA-PELE, IFA QUEST: THE SEARCH FOR THE SOURCE OF SANTERiA AND LUCUMi 
82 (1991). 
163. This is not to suggest that Judeo-Christian religions have no oral traditions, or that 
earth-based belief systems have no written traditions. However, generally speaking, those 
religions which fall within or derive from Judeo-Christian origins tend to rely on and cen-
ter on the written word, as manifested in the Bible, Talmud, or Koran, for example. "The 
Bible and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 199 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992) (citing WILUAM CHILLINGWORTH, 
THE REUGION OF PROTEST ANTS.) Many, if not most earth-based belief systems tend to con-
i 
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women in the central tenets or beliefs of the religion. The third critical di-
vergence arises out of the view and role of land and nature. The cases where 
"other" beliefs, practices and spiritual views have been brought before the 
courts cannot be fully and completely comprehended without understanding 
how these three characteristics have functioned as the unidentified, unac-
knowledged puppeteers which have manipulated and obscured the thinking 
and reasoning of the decisionmakers. 
1. The Voice or the Book 
Write the vision and make it plain upon tables, that he may run that 
readeth it. l64 
Behind naming, beneath words, is something else. An existence 
named unnamed and unnameable. . . . We say the inarticulate have 
no souls .... Yet for our own lives we grieve all that cannot be spo-
ken, that there is no name for, repeating for ourselves the names of 
things which surround what cannot be named. 165 
In Judeo-Christian theologies, there is a disproportionate emphasis and 
significance given to the written word. l66 However, in numerous other 
spiritual traditions, typically earth-based ones, beliefs, ceremonies, rituals 
and understandings are generally passed down orally. 167 Written text, in 
fact, is often forbidden because of the specific knowledge being shared or 
transmitted. 168 "Sacred knowledge can be a kind of intellectual property. 
tinue as they began--in an oral tradition passed on through each generation. 
164. 2 Habakkuk 2 (emphasis added). 
165. SUSAN GRIFFIN BROWN, WOMAN AND NATURE 190 (1978). 
166. The Bible is replete with references which support this premise. In the Islamic re-
ligion, which has the Koran as its sacred written text, Jesus is considered "the Word which 
God placed into Mary." ANNE MARIE SCIllMMEL, IsLAM: .AN INTRODUCTION 73 (1992). 
The Koran is considered "not the word of a prophet but the unadulterated word of 
God .... " Id. at 29. Similarly, the Torah is considered to be "the Law as the will of Yah-
weh revealed through the priests." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 3546 (Paul Kevin Meagher 
et al. eds., 1979). The Vedas, in Hinduism, while not exactly analogous to the Bible, for 
example, are also written sacred texts. ("The Vedas ... and other writings comprising the 
sacred canon of Brahmanic Hinduism, recognized as authoritative in all orthodox Hindu-
ism"). Id. at 3647. 
167. "This history of the sacred pipe of the Sioux was handed down orally by the former 
Keeper of The Sacred Pipe, Elk Head (Hehaka Pa) .... " THE SACRED PIPE: BLACK ELK'S 
ACCOUNT OF THE SEVEN RITES OF THE OGLALA SIOUX xii (Joseph E. Brown ed., 1984). See 
also L. ERNESTO PICHARDO, ODUDUWA OBATALA 1-2 (1984) (stating that Santeria was an 
oral tradition until this century; the first writings were done in secret); ACAOOHKIWINA AND 
ACIMOWINA: TRADITIONAL NARRATIVES OF THE ROCK CREE INDIANS (Robert A. Brightman 
ed., 1989) (including accounts of sacred rites and rituals traditionally passed down orally 
now being written down for fear they will be lost forever). 
168. Russel Barsh's article is instructive in noting the Australian case of Foster v. 
Mountford, 29 F.L.R. 233 (N. Terr. Sup. Ct. 1976). Barsh, supra note 139, at 391. That 
case arose when members of the Pitjantjara Council (an Aboriginal group) sought to block 
the publication of a book by the defendant/author Dr. Mountford. Thirty-five years earlier, 
1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I1I~'~'i~i~1BII 
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Disclosure can destroy its sacramentality. ,,169 Additionally, as the court in 
the Foster case acknowledged, not everyone is permitted to have access to 
all information. 170 This becomes even more complicated when the law is 
turned to for protection, because, as Barsh has pointed out, "[g]overnment 
action or private litigation to protect a religious site or practice unavoidably 
entails public documentation, which can destroy what is to be saved.,,171 
This concept stands in complete opposition to Judeo-Christian beliefs, which 
most often elevate that which is written over that which is not. I72 It also re-
flects a general cultural perspective regarding knowledge. That which is 
written is tangible, and, therefore, knowable. While there is nothing prob-
lematic with that perspective, in and of itself, where it requires an absolute a 
rejection of other possible ways of knowledge, one is left with the rejection 
of any evidence, for example, derived from oral traditions. 173 
This myopic approach does not work in the area of religious freedom. 
The jurisprudence reflects a certain entrenched cultural predisposition to 
trust only that which is documented or documentable ("scientific") and to 
distrust that which is not ("intuitive," "irrational,,).174 It is ironic that this 
the Pitjantjara people had taken Dr. Mountford "into their confidence, they showed him 
and explained to him sacred sites and objects, paintings and rock engravings, and he re-
corded their myths and totemic geography by aboriginal drawings, the camera and the 
notebook." Foster, 29 F.L.R. at 236. The author had even acknowledged, in his foreword, 
that his book "should be used only after consultation with local male religious 
leaders .... " Id. The plaintiffs argued that the revelation of this information was a breach 
of confidence, and that the book revealed secrets that, the court found, if revealed to 
"women, children and uninitiated men may undennine the social and religious stability of 
their hard-pressed community." Id. 
169. Barsh, supra note 139, at 391 (emphasis added). 
170. Foster, 29 F.L.R. at 236. 
171. Barsh, supra note 139, at 392. 
172. "Blessed Lord, who hast caused all holy Scriptures to be written for our learning; 
Grant that we may in such wise hear them, read, mark, learn .... " BOOK OF COMMON 
PRAYER, reprinted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 120 (1992) (emphasis 
added). The subtext here, of course, reinforces the ideas that the "one truth," "one idea," 
"one word," inherent in monotheism, are captured in the "one" Book ("the Word," "the 
Good Book"). See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
173. This approach dominates law and science. Generally, evidence labeled anecdotal, 
as opposed to empirical, is dismissed or discounted. It is this view that is reflected in the 
weight courts give not only to certain types of evidence, but certain witnesses. For exam-
ple, in Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the plaintiffs, Navajos and Hopis, 
filed suit seeking to stop the expansion of ski slopes in the San Francisco Peaks, sacred to 
both tribes. The plaintiffs' affidavits asserted that the Peaks (including the pennit area) 
were indispensable to their religious practices. The district court, however, rejected the 
position that the pennit area was central to their religions. Id. at 745 n.7. The appellate 
court upheld the decision, noting that the evidence that all of the Peaks are sacred, includ-
ing the ski area that was to be expanded, "does not establish the indispensability of the 
pennit area." Id. This finding seemed to mirror the testimony of two government wit-
nesses who were experts on the Navajo and Hopi religions. Id. at 744. It would appear, 
therefore, that the experts on religious beliefs and practices carried more weight in court 
than did the practitioners themselves, who argued otherwise. 
174. There is clearly a connection here between the negative societal views towards 
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partiality has been extended to religion, given that religion, generally, turns 
on, and indeed requires, faith in that which is not provable. But certain re-
ligious beliefs have become ensconced in the culture, and deference to writ-
ten texts is one of them. Because monotheistic precepts require a rejection 
of the other, those others, especially those others that are based on oral tra-
ditions, are labeled "supernatural," or "uncivilized" and are therefore easily 
dismissed. 175 The recent uproar arising from the revelation in Bob Wood-
ward's book, The Chosen, that Hillary Rodham Clinton had "visualized" a 
conversation with Eleanor Roosevelt, is only another example of this. Even 
in those articles "defending" the First Lady (including those relying on 
spokespersons for the Clintons), the sneering tones with which they dis-
cussed the topic reflects a general disdain for what may in fact be the genu-
ine religious beliefs of others. 176 Indeed, there is an arrogance in mocking 
even the idea that one may communicate with spirits, (or rocks or trees, for 
that matter), while not fmding it at all odd to believe in angels, a burning 
bush, or a resurrection from the dead, all concepts set forth in the Bible. 
However, that which cannot, or should not, be labeled or named is outside of 
one's control, and thus is less palatable in an ordered, hierarchical uni-
verse. I77 
women and what are traditionally described as feminine characteristics, i.e., emotion vs. 
intellect or intuition vs. reason. 
175. The definition for supernatural is telling: "of or caused by power above the forces of 
nature." OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 923 (Eugene Ehrlich et al. eds., 1980) (emphasis 
added). But in fact, others would argue that those things typically labelled "supernatural" 
(spirits, for example) are not "above" nature, but simply a part of nature. 
176. "Washington was titillated when Sunday's Washington Post ran ... excerpts from 
'The Choice' ... that says the president's wife found encouragement by talking with Jean 
Houston, co-director of the Foundation for Mind Research, which studies psychic experi-
ence." First Lady Defended on Ties to New Age Author, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at 
All. Even Dr. Houston herself stated: "I'm not a psychic! I don't believe in spirits and 
spooks!" Paula Span, Spirits Lifted, Not Summoned: Philosopher Jean Houston Denies 
Role as First Lady's Spiritual Guide, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at Cl. She went on to 
note: "Mrs. Clinton is a very committed Christian, a serious Methodist. The president is a 
prayerful man." Id. Deborah Tannen, a linguistics professor who wrote a New York 
Times Op-Ed piece on this issue, zeroed in on the sexism underlying the attacks on Dr. 
Houston and Hillary Rodham Clinton, by comparing how differently, i.e., matter of factly, 
the media report on male athletes and businesses who rely on visualization and other such 
techniques to be successful. Deborah Tannen, The Guru Gap, N.Y. TIMES, at A19. But 
what has gone unnoticed is why one set of beliefs (psychics, channeling, seances) is inher-
ently ridiculous, while another (God speaking to Moses, archangels, Lot's wife turning to a 
pillar of salt) is not. It is impossible to imagine a newspaper in this country discussing 
these latter beliefs in any way other than respectfully, if not reverentially. I am simply 
suggesting here that the media reaction is not very different from the implicit reactions and 
views of many judges. 
177. See GRIFFIN BROWN, supra note 165, at 51-52, 190-91. Griffin quotes Carolus Lin-
naeus: "The first step of science is to know one thing from another. .. but in order that it 
may be fixed and permanent distinct names must be given to different things and those 
names must be recorded and remembered." Id. at 146 (citation omitted). This seems to be 
equally applicable to Judeo-Christian religions. 
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The sin Adam and Eve committed in the Garden of Eden was attempting 
to become knowledgeable. Their attempt opened the further possibility that, 
with knowledge, they might become immortal. This apparently was not ac-
ceptable, not because knowledge and immortality were sinful but because 
possession of them by human beings would reorder the hierarchical princi-
ples on which the Judeo-Christian universe is posited.17s 
Judeo-Christian religions are inherently hierarchical. Thus, those spiri-
tual belief systems which rely on oral traditions, and which are typically 
non-hierarchical and non-institutionalized, are rarely given the same recog-
nition as a religion qua religion that a "knowable" religion is. 
2. Women, Men and God(s) 
This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be 
called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. 179 
There is a spirit that pervades everything, that is capable of power-
ful song and radiant movement. . .. Com Woman is one aspect of 
her, and Earth Woman is another, and what they together have made 
is called Creation, Earth, creatures, plants, and light. At the center 
of all is Woman, and nothing is sacred. . . without her blessing, her 
thinking.lS0 
The role of women in Judeo-Christian theologies, versus the role or roles 
in earth-based, animistic religions, is another clear point of divergence. In 
Judeo-Christian theologies, women are subordinate to men, as Paul's mes-
sage to the Corinthians ("the head of woman is her husband,,)lsl ... Genesis 
states that God (the Father) made man in his image, and "male and female 
he created them."IS2 But in numerous earth-based traditions, woman is rec-
ognized as being a creator or co-creator, a fundamentally different idea in-
deed. 1S3 The religious and cultural roles of and views about women vary ac-
cordingly. 
In Judeo-Christian theological schemes, a woman is most often seen as 
the evil temptress responsible for the downfall of man: "The woman whom 
thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat."I84 Those 
ideas, coupled with the notion of woman coming from the rib of Adam, when 
translated into a broader culture, create a perspective of woman as "the 
178. ALLEN, supra note 152, at 58. 
179. 2 Genesis 23. 
180. ALLEN, supra note 152, at 13. 
181. 1 Corinthians 11. 
182. 1 Genesis 26, 27. 
183. See generally THE BOOK OF THE GoDDESS PAST AND PRESENT (Carl Olsen ed., 1985); 
ALLEN, supra note 152, at 13-29; GoNZALEZ-WIPPLER, supra note 131, at 24-30. See also 
Barsh, supra note 139, at 364-65. 
184. 3 Genesis 12. 
Winter 1997] ALL ROADS ARE GOOD 63 
weaker sex" whose role must, by defInition, always be subordinate to that of 
man. 185 Excluding the Virgin Mary, Christianity has no woman approaching 
goddess status. 
However, where you have a religious system where woman is creator or 
co-creator,186 you will have a society that reflects entirely different views 
about women in its communities. 187 In Santeria, for example, the goddess 
Yemaya (the moon goddess who also controls the water) gave forth, on her 
death, to fourteen of the gods of the Yoruba people. The city where she 
died, lIe Ife, became known as the holy City.188 In various Indian religions, 
there are numerous women creators or co-creators, such as Spider Woman, 
Hard Beings Woman, Sky Woman, Thought Woman, and White Buffalo 
Woman. 189 Of course, numerous pre-Christian religions also had women 
deities. 190 When women are either absent from a theology, or portrayed 
negatively, over time a culture that relies on that theology also reflects the 
view of women as subordinate. This makes it that much more diffIcult to 
comprehend a religion that not only rejects that idea, but affIrmatively sets 
out women as deities. This aggravates the existing problem of misunder-
standing a religious claim that arises outside historically monotheistic relig-
ions. 
3. Nature 
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: 
and let them have dominion over the fIsh of the sea, and over the 
fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth and over 
every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. 191 
185. "The power of woman is her dependence, flowing from the consciousness of that 
weakness which God has given her for protection. But when she assumes the place and 
tone of man as public reformer ... she yields the power which God has given her for her 
protection, and her character becomes unnatural .... " ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 
53 (1976) (quoting a pastoral letter from the Congregational Church sent to the Grimk6 
sisters who had been speaking out publicly against slavery) (citation omitted). 
186. This is not meant to refer to woman as mother. Rather, it refers to "She Who 
Thinks rather than She Who Bears ... [aJ woman as creation thinker and female thought 
as origin of material and nonmaterial reality. In this epistemology, the perception of fe-
male power as confined to maternity is a limit on the power inherent in femininity." 
ALLEN, supra note 152, at 15. 
187. For example, the Cherokee, in times of war, had a red government, which included 
among its officers "Beloved, Pretty or War Women." RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE 
SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 26 (1975). The Cherokee, like many other 
Indian nations, was matrilineal. Id. at 22. See also ALLEN, supra note 152, at 20-32. 
188. GoNZALEZ-WIPPLER, supra note 131, at 26. Two of those gods propagated the hu-
man race. Id. 
189. ALLEN, supra note 152, at 13-17. 
190. See generally THE BOOK OF THE GoDDESS PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 183. 
191. 1 Genesis 26. 
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Nature is sacred because it reveals ... the Great Mystery.192 
I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river is a strong 
b d 193 rown go .... 
Religious views regarding written versus oral traditions, or the role of 
women, take on greater significance as differences between theological per-
spectives, when the last critical divergence between Judeo-Christian and 
earth-based religions is examined. Divergent cultural and religious views 
about nature-who or what it is, why it is, and humanity's relationship to 
and with it--are perhaps the single biggest impediment to just resolution of 
free exercise cases involving earth-based religions. A Judeo-Christian theo-
logical view which separates, and makes man and woman "apart" from and 
above nature, is entirely different from animistic religions. 
In English, one can divide the universe into two parts: the natural and 
the supernatural. Humanity has no real part in either, being neither animal 
nor spirit--that is, the supernatural is discussed as though it were apart 
from people, and the natural as though people were apart from it. This nec-
essarily forces English-speaking people into a position of alienation from the 
world they live in. Such isolation is entirely foreign to American Indian 
thought. At base, every story, every song, every ceremony tells the Indian 
that each creature is part of a living whole and that all parts of that whole 
are related to one another by virtue of their participation in the whole of be-
ing. 194 
The belief that the relationship between a person and nature is non-
hierarchical runs counter to the very foundations of Judeo-Christian the-
ologies, which have set nature out to be an inanimate object to be dominated 
by the "higher being"-man. This is a very different view indeed, than one 
which sees humans as simply one of many in the universe. As every form 
has some of the intelligent spirit of the Creator, we cannot but reverence all 
parts of the creation.,,195 All parts of nature are living beings. Further, if 
deities are present in all of nature, and nature itself is a deity (i.e. the Earth 
as Mother, literally, not as metaphor), then one does not need an intermedi-
ary (such as a priest or minister) in order to simply communicate with one's 
deities. Nor is there any need for a theological, institutionalized hierarchy 
based on gender. 
Here lies the answer to why it is so essential to culture that the image of 
divinity be male. . .. And here is why the idea that earlier cultures might 
have worshipped a Great Goddess remains to some minds shaped by this 
192. Barsh, supra note 139, at 365 (citing A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF AND WORSillP IN 
NATIVE AMERICA 27 (1981 ». 
193. T.S. ELIOT, The Dry Salvages, in FOUR QUARTETS 21,21 (1943). 
194. ALLEN, supra note 152, at 60. 
195. BROWN, supra note 151, at 70 (citation omitted). 
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culture absurd and unthinkable. For the proposition that woman, who is 
nature, could be sacred is not a possible concept in a culture which is by 
definition above nature. 196 
A theology that rests in part on an established hierarchy within human-
ity, and without, will take a markedly different view of nature than one that, 
for example, sees little spiritually significant distinction between a human 
and animal. In fact, in many such religious views, animals have special 
significance as manifestations of a deity, and because, according to some 
creation myths, they may have been created before humans. Animals may 
be seen as intermediaries between humans and deities. 197 All living things 
come from one creation, and therefore all are related!98 Relationships ex-
tend outwards, from familial blood lines, to plants, and the elements. 199 For 
instance, the Ifa tradition, a West African religious system which is also a 
basis for Santeria and Lucumi, is based on the study of nature.2OO Various 
aspects of nature are not merely symbols in a theology, they are the essence 
of what is often called God. 
D. THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 
Consider an essential belief and knowledge that says the earth is alive, 
she is the mother and she is sacred, that a particular set of mountains are not 
only one of four sacred mountains marking the boundaries of your home-
land, but are in fact a living deity. Or consider an essential belief and 
knowledge that says your gods live in these same mountains, that they create 
the rain and snow that allow you to grow, in dry desert soil, the corn that 
you eat; and that the herbs, plants and animals you rely on in your prayers 
and rituals are all located in these same mountains. Or consider the belief 
and knowledge that your people first met with the Creator at a certain butte, 
where your people learned their sacred ceremonies, and where you still go to 
worship, pray and communicate with your deity. Or consider the belief and 
knowledge that a certain tract of land has always been used by your people 
for religious rituals, and it is an indispensable part of your religious life 
(which is inseparable from your life overall). Now imagine that you have 
been told by a court that the need for more ski slopes, parking lots and a new 
ski lodge outweigh your interests in trying to protect your "church," the San 
Francisco Peaks. These were the facts of Wilson v. Blo ck, 20 1 where the 
court held that "the plaintiffs have not shown an impermissible burden on 
196. SUSAN GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE 
71 (1981). 
197. BROWN, supra note 151, at 38. Oftentimes, deities take the form of animals. 
198. Barsh, supra note 139, at 366. 
199. BROWN, supra note 151, at 53. 
200. FATUNMBI, supra note 162, at 20. 
201. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). 
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religion.,,202 This holding was reached in the face of testimony that stated: 
It is my opinion that in the long run if the expansion is permitted, we 
will not be able successfully to teach our people that this is a sacred 
place ... the basis of our existence as a society will become a mere 
fairy tale to our people. .. The destruction of these practices will 
also destroy our present way of life and culture.203 
The court's language and approach as evidenced by their holding 
"notwithstanding the plaintiffs' concerns. . . ,,204 reflects an absolute inability 
and unwillingness to extend beyond a particular view of god and nature. 
The court held that a plaintiff trying to restrict the government's use of its 
land would have to show that "the government's proposed land use would 
impair a religious practice that could not be performed at any other site. ,,205 
The court also noted that the established evidence presented in the case that 
all of the San Francisco Peaks are sacred "does not establish the indispen-
sability of the pennit area.,,206 
This compartmentalized view of the problem is a clear indication that 
the court does not have slightest comprehension of what the plaintiffs were 
arguing. This statement is akin to telling a Muslim pilgrim, for example, 
that a government's proposed transformation of Mecca into a resort city will 
not impinge on any fundamental religious belief, as the Muslim can simply 
go and pray elsewhere. Or telling a devout Catholic that she can no longer 
take communion, but she can still believe in transubstantiation if she so 
chooses, or a Jew that the Wailing Wall will now become a fast food restau-
rant, but one stone wall at which to pray is as good as any other. 
What seems to be the bottom line for the court, in this case and others, is 
the absolute supremacy of the historical, monotheistic view of god fIrst, then 
humans, then nature, in a strict hierarchical relationship. What is also re-
flected in these cases is one culture's sanctity and reverence for the owner-
ship of land, and from that, a fundamental, virtually unrestricted right to the 
use of one's land, be it governmental or private property. This implicit 
thread, running through a line of cases regarding sacred sites, became ex-
plicit in Fools Crow v. Gullet.207 There, Fools Crow and others, on behalf 
of the Lakota nation, and Bill Red Hat and others, on behalf of the Tsistsis-
tas nation,208 sued the State Park Manager of Bear Butte State Park. The 
202. Id. at 740. One hesitates to imagine what would be an impennissible burden. 
203. Id. at 740 n.2 (quoting testimony of Abbott Sekaquaptewa, then-chainnan of the 
Hopi tribe). 
204. Id. at 741 (emphasis added). 
205. Id. at 744 (emphasis added). 
206. Id. at 745 n.7. 
207. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
208. The named individual plaintiffs included traditional chiefs and spiritual leaders. Id. 
at 787. Fools Crow was Ceremonial Chief of the Teton Sioux, and a renowned spiritual 
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plaintiffs' witnesses testified as to the absolute centrality and sacredness of 
Bear Butte for the Lakota and Tsistsistas peoples. As in the Wilson case, 
the government was the owner of the land and managed a park there. The 
lawsuit arose from proposed further encroachments, although part of the suit 
challenged the existing desecration of the area.209 Tourists were allowed to 
camp, roads and parking lots were cut through the site, and the proposed 
additions included the construction of an access road and parking lot adja-
cent to an area used for religious ceremonies.210 "Worshipers/campers" 
could obtain permits that allowed ten day "camping" permits, as opposed to 
the five day maximum at "non-religious" sites.2II In discussing the fact that 
the plaintiffs allegedly had no objections to the park providing outdoor bath-
rooms, free firewood and garbage disposals, and that permits had never been 
denied for worship or ceremonial purposes,212 the court noted one exception: 
when construction on the parking lot and road Hat the traditional ceremo-
nial ground" precluded overnight camping.213 
In denying the plaintiffs' claim, the court in Fools Crow focused on sev-
eral key points following a natural progression in reasoning derived from the 
earlier cases of Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority2I4 and Badoni v. 
Higginson2I5 cases. First, the court found that the plaintiffs had no property 
interest in the land,216 i.e., they did not own the land.217 Second, it reasoned 
leader. See generally MAILS, supra note 153. Arvol Looking Horse, another plaintiff in 
the case, is the keeper of the Sacred Calf Pipe. Id. at 55. 
209. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 785. 
2] O. Id. at 788-89. The court also said that the specific area was used by Indians for 
camping as well. But in reviewing the evidence cited in the opinion, the "camping" was 
not recreational, but for extended (i.e., more than one day) ceremonies. 
211. Id. at 789. The court noted that the record showed no evidence that plaintiffs had 
ever been denied access for ceremony or worship. /d. 
212. A critical point here, however, is that in fact permits had been denied. Barsh, supra 
note 139, at 405 n.286. Barsh cites the Joint Appendix in the case and states that there 
was uncontroverted testimony on this issue. Id. Barsh also states: "The court furthermore 
accepted the State administrator's contentions that 'numerous people,' whom he could not 
identify but 'appeared to be American Indian people,' had asked for road improvements, 
and that medicine man Fools Crow had been 'pleased' with the road, over hearsay objec-
tions and Fools Crow's vigorous denial under oath." Id. 
213. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 789 (emphasis added). 
214. 620 F.2d ] 159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
215. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). 
216. Fools Crow, 54] F. Supp. at 791. In Badoni, the Tenth Circuit had rejected the 
district court's finding that the plaintiffs had no property interest in the land as dispositive. 
Id. Rather, it held that "the government must manage its property in a manner that does 
not offend the Constitution." Id. at 176. In Sequoyah, the Sixth Circuit had a more quali-
fied view of the matter. It stated that while a lack of property interest "is a fact to be con-
sidered, we feel it should not be conclusive in view of the history of the Cherokee expul-
sion from Southern Appalachia." Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1159, 1164 (emphasis added). 
217. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791. Private ownership ofland is essentially antitheti-
cal to religious beliefs that view humans as caretakers and guardians of nature and the 
earth. Thus, while there was no "property" interest in the land, as owner, there clearly was 
(and is) an interest in Bear Butte, generally, and specifically as a ceremonial place. 
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that the religious practices were not absolutely prohibited.218 However, wor-
shiper's offerings were taken by campers, photographs were taken of cere-
monies, and campers and hikers frequently disrupted songs and prayers.219 
Nevertheless, the Fools Crow court concluded that the infringements on re-
ligious exercise at Bear Butte were not as bad, by comparison, as those in 
Badoni22o The Badoni court held that none of these facts constituted a vio-
lation of the Free Exercise Clause or Sequoyah221 and therefore, were per-
missible.222 The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the 
defendants had impermissibly burdened their religion.223 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a court holding likewise, had 
another set of plaintiffs presented evidence that the government had taken 
over ownership of Holy Trinity Church, had decided to put hiking trails, 
parking lots and camping sites throughout the cemetery on the lands behind 
the church, and had opened up the church for tours to be conducted during 
church services and prayers. To complete the analogy, one would have to 
extend this scenario to include a requirement that parishioners register be-
fore entering the church, obtain permits from the government stating when 
they can pray, and limiting their visits to the church for praying and partici-
pation in services to times the government had pre-determined. I do not be-
lieve that there is a court anywhere in this country that would not immedi-
ately condemn such a practice and find, without hesitation, an absolute 
violation of the First Amendment. Yet federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have upheld such practices time and again, as applied to Indian relig-
ions. 
These issues came to a head in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association.224 There, the United States Forest Service wanted to 
build a paved road through federal lands. The road was to pass through the 
Chimney Rock portion of Six Rivers National Forest in Califomia.225 That 
portion of land had traditionally been used by Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa 
Indians for religious rituals and practices; privacy, silence and the natural 
state of the surroundings are integral parts of the religions.226 The required 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 788. 
220. Badoni. 638 F.2d 172. In Badoni. the government's impounding water to form Lake 
Powell drowned some of the Navajo plaintiffs' gods, the Navajos were denied access to a 
sacred prayer spot, and tourists were allowed to visit Rainbow Bridge, a previously iso-
lated sacred site. 
221. Although in Sequoyah the impoundment created by the Tellico dam would flood 
land the court acknowledged as a sacred homeland to the Cherokee people and destroy sa-
cred sites, holy places and cemetaries, the court held it did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause. Sequoyah. 620 F.2d 1159. 
222. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792. 
223. Id. at 793. 
224. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
225. Id. at 442. 
226. Id. 
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environmental impact statement found that the building of a road "would 
cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an inte-
gral and necessary part of the belief systems. . .. ,,227 The fmal recommen-
dation was that the road project be abandoned, a fmding ultimately rejected 
by the Forest Service.228 The District Court granted a permanent injunction, 
based in part on a fmding that the road, and a timber harvesting plan also 
proposed, would viola~e the Free Exercise Clause. The Ninth Circuit af-
frrmed in part, including the portion that rested on the fmding of a constitu-
tional violation.229 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court 
reversed. Finding the issue in Lyng to be indistinguishable from Bowen v. 
Roy,230 where applicants for benefits opposed the requirement of a Social 
Security number for their daughter for fear it would rob her spirit,231 the 
Court noted that: 
The challenged Government action would interfere significantly with 
private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to 
their own beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected in-
dividuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating their 
religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize re-
ligious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, 
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. 232 
Even in the face of expert testimony regarding the devastation the road 
construction would cause, the Court refused to yield on its stance. It stated 
that even were it to adopt the Ninth Circuit's prediction that the road would 
"virtually destroy the . . . Indians' ability to practice their religion, the 
Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding 
respondent's legal claims. ,,233 The truly determinative factor was once again 
the question of land ownership. In reviewing the religious rituals and cere-
monies related to the land in question, the Court explicitly noted: "No disre-
spect for these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs could 
easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of 
227. Id. (citing a study of American Indian cultural and religious sites in the area com-
missioned by the Forest Service). 
228. Id. at 442. 
229. Id. at 444. 
230. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
23 I . Id. at 696. 
232. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). Some of the Court's tortured reasoning in 
this case foreshadowed the disingenuous manueverings in the Smith case two years later. 
The Lyng Court rejected the argument that the burdens on religious exercise here were 
much greater than those in Bowen, stating that it could look to the underlying beliefs in 
either case. Therefore, it noted that it could not tell the difference between the two claims, 
and so the same result would obtain. In other words, the two claims seem to be the same, 
but we can't (or, rather, won't) look beyond the surface to see whether that is true and 
whether a different result warranted. 
233. Id. at 45 I. 
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public property.,,234 The language and tone of the statement makes clear the 
very idea is ridiculous without ever explaining why. The sentiment underly-
ing this statement-that there is of course, an understanding "by all" as to 
why "we" would never want such a result-is distressingly consistent with 
the jurisprudence in this area of the law. As Justice Brennan noted in his 
dissent, "the Court embraces the Government's contention that its preroga-
tive as landowner should always take precedence over a claim that a particu-
lar use of federal property infringes religious practices. ,,235 The virtual in-
violability of land ownership, even when the owner is the government acting 
as representative of the people, supersedes the claims of different groups to 
continue their spiritual beliefs, traditions, cultures and histories, all of which 
are interconnected. 
What is difficult to discern in the line of cases discussed above is a just 
basis for why it was acceptable for the Court, in one instance, to permit the 
actual or virtual destruction of a people's way of life ("today's ruling sacri-
fices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along with the spiritual 
well-being of its approximately 5,000 adherents .... ,,236) under the guise of 
refusing preferential treatment,237 while in the other, where the Amish com-
munity was involved, the Court readily struck down a state law which would 
"ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church com-
munity as it exists in the United States today.,,238 There Chief Justice Bur-
ger went to great lengths to expound on the virtues of the Amish239 and up-
held the right of the Amish to live their lives relatively free of governmental 
interference. 
Ironically, although some of the Amish cultural and/or religious charac-
teristics identified in that case were similar to the beliefs and traditions of 
Native Americans, as set out in Badoni, Sequoyah, Fools Crow and Lyng, 
yet characteristics met with opposite legal results. One such characteristic 
was the relationship of the people to and with nature. Compare the Amish 
devotion to "a life in harmony with nature and the soil ... ,,240 with the Na-
vajo and Hopi, for whom the San Francisco Peaks are a living deity and a 
source of healing plants and herbs and place of prayer and ceremonies.241 
234. [d. at 453. 
235. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
236. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
237. See id. at 452 ("The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike .... "). 
238. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,212 (1972). 
239. Id. at 222. See also id. at 212-13. "[T]he Amish community has been a highly suc-
cessful social unit. ... Its members are productive and very law-abiding members of so-
ciety; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modem forms .... " While all of the 
above information was apparently very meaningful to Justice Burger, I can find no legal 
relevance in it. One would hope he was not suggesting that religious liberty is or should 
somehow be tied to some sort of merit test. 
240. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210. 
241. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 738 (1983). 
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Or consider that in both Yoder and several of the sacred site cases, there was 
expert testimony that the governmental action in question would have devas-
tating consequences for the community involved.242 
In fact, as Justice Brennan made clear, there was no substantive differ-
ence between Yoder and Lyng.243 Actually, Brennan's dissent went a step 
further, proclaiming that indeed, the threat to the plaintiffs in Lyng, was 
"both more direct and more substantial. ,,244 Justice Brennan identified ex-
plicitly what implicitly drove the majority's reasoning-an overriding con-
cern for the Government's rights as owner and manager of land, and a fear 
of numerous future Native American land use cases, seeking ever broader 
prohibitions on land use.245 Indeed, it is the dissent in L yng which brings to 
a head the general conflict between Judea-Christian values and perspectives 
and those integral to earth-based religions. As Justice Brennan noted, Lyng 
represented "yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict between 
two disparate cultures--the dominant Western culture, which views land in 
terms of ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which con-
cepts of private property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief system 
that holds land sacred.,,246 
Further, as the dissent made clear, the Lyng decision would produce a 
profound impact that the majority refused to even acknowledge. "Given to-
day's ruling, that freedom [to maintain religious beliefs] amounts to nothing 
more than the right to believe that their religion will be destroyed. ,,247 Given 
case precedent, with an almost consistent lack of constitutional protections 
being afforded earth-based religions, the Court's decision in Smith248 two 
years after Lyng should not have surprised anyone.249 The monodirectional 
242. "[C]ompulsory high school attendance could result in the destruction of the Old Or-
der Amish church community as it exists in the United States today." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 
212. "[C]onstructing a road ... 'would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred 
areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of the 
Northwest California Indian peoples. '" Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective 
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988) (citation omitted). "The Hopis and Navajos believe that 
they owe a duty to the deities to maintain the San Francisco Peaks in their natural state. 
They believe that breach of that duty will lead to serious adverse consequences for their 
peoples." Wilson, 708 F. 2d at 740. "Plaintiffs believe that if humans alter the earth in 
the area of the Bridge, plaintiffs' prayers will not be heard by the gods and their ceremo-
nies will be ineffective to prevent evil and disease." Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 
177 (10th Cir 1980). 
243. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, l, dissenting). 
244. Id. at 467-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
245. Id. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 477 (Brennan, l, dissenting). 
248. Empl. Div., Dep't. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
Where the Supreme Court rejected the compelling interest test. The Plaintiffs, Smiths' 
drug counselors, were denied unemployment compensation after losing their jobs because 
of their spiritual use of peyote. 
249. James Ryan has argued that free exercise cases generally do not receive enough at-
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journey of free exercise jurisprudence continues. 
PART III: ALL ROADS ARE GOOD 
Throughout this Article, I have argued that Judeo-Christian thought, 
values and cultural characteristics dominate the jurisprudence of the Free 
Exercise Clause. Even if one accepts that there may once have been a valid 
historical basis for this (a relatively religiously homogenous population), 
that basis no longer exists, and has not existed for a long while. The state of 
American jurisprudence in the area of free exercise derives from, and is 
dominated by, a monomaniacal demand for absolute certainty that is consis-
tent with monotheistic religious thought. This is reflected both by the re-
quirement that religion have a deftnition, and by the formulation of a defIni-
tion which dictates that religion be concerned with absolutes. That is, the 
existing defmition requires that the belief system focus on answers, cer-
tainty, and "naming" the mystery, rather than simply acknowledging "that 
which cannot be known." 
Long ago, courts established a hegemonic defmition of what constitutes 
religion. In the last few decades, only slight changes to that defmition have 
appeared. Overall the path traveled in the realm of the Free Exercise Clause 
has been straight and narrow. It has often been presumed that the problems 
which exist in free exercise interpretation and application derive from the 
specific defInition of religion being used,2S0 rather than with the idea of any 
defInition at all.2SI I believe that it is not simply the defmition that is the 
problem. Rather, we must step back and question why we strive for a 
defmition at all. A defInition inherently contains within it the power to ex-
tention, which, he says, explains why the Smith decision provoked such a reaction. Ryan, 
supra, note 17, at 1407-08. Even the Babalu-Aye decision, where plaintiffs actually won 
on their claim, does not represent a true victory in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise 
Clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
There, where the City of Hialeah sought to prohibit animal sacrifice, a fundamental relig-
ious practice in the Santeria religion, it did so by poorly drafting statutes that were both 
overly broad and narrowly drawn. See id. at 521-22. It was that fact, coupled with a legis-
lative history that showed an absolute intention to reach only the Santeria church, that led 
the Supreme Court to strike down the statutes. Id. at 534-42. It seems clear from both that 
opinion, id. at 538-39, and the legislative history of the RFRA, that a "properly" drawn 
statute prohibiting animal sacrifice could survive a constitutional free exercise challenge, 
despite the practice's centrality to the Santeria religion. See, e.g., 139 CONGo REc. 
S14,467 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("It is certainly not the in-
tent of Congress to stifle the enforcement of religious-neutral laws that protect animals. "). 
250. See, e.g., James M. Donovan, God Is As God Does: Law, Anthropology and the 
Definiton of "Religion," 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 26-27 (1995). 
251. But see George C. Freeman, ill, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Defi-
nition of "Religion, "71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1519-20 (1983). I agree with Freeman's conclu-
sion that there can not be a workable definition, but not necessarily for all of the same rea-
sons. As I have argued throughout this Article, I believe that the very idea of and need for 
a definition, in and of itself, is, in some way, a specifically religious perspective, i.e., one 
derived from a Judeo-Christian, monotheistic approach to the world and life. 
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clude all that falls outside of its boundaries. Thus, if we mean to broaden 
the jurisprudence in this area at all, in order to go beyond the boundaries of 
the Judeo-Christian construct now being applied, then a "better" definition is 
not the answer. Instead, we must look past the desire for absolute predict-
ability and certainty, and embrace rather than shirk from "ad hoc" justice.252 
The implicit fear of ad hoc justice on one hand, and the longing for a work-
able defmition of religion on the other, are rooted in the same Judeo-
Christian principles that I discussed earlier in this Article-fear of the un-
known and the desire to name and predict and thus to control (e.g., written 
over oral traditions, man over nature, woman subordinate to man). For 
these reasons, free exercise jurisprudence cannot genuinely protect a broader 
class of religious claims unless it abandons its absolute definitional analysis. 
A. NAMING 
But in a moment that which is behind naming makes itself 
known. . . . And all this knowledge is in the souls of everything, be-
hind naming, before speaking, beneath words.253 
The focus on abetter, more inclusive defmition of religion is misplaced, 
if the intention is to improve (i.e. make more fair) the application of the Free 
Exercise Clause to non-Judeo-Christian religions. It seems that what is be-
hind the craving for some level of exactitude, which a definition would ar-
guably provide, is fear of the unknown and unnamed. This apprehension 
includes a fear of the "other,"--that which is different.254 Under these cir-
cumstances a clearer, more meaningful defmition of religion cannot expand 
or enrich the jurisprudence in this area. This need for certainty and answers 
is a part of Judeo-Christian tradition and thought. 255 A monotheistic relig-
ious tradition that emphasizes answers more than questions, when translated 
into legal doctrine, lends itself quite easily to a predisposition against the 
"other." If then, such a tradition gets manifested expressly, or otherwise, in 
the jurisprudence of free exercise, as I have argued it does, it is that much 
easier to understand the disconcerting results and specious reasoning ob-
tained in so many free exercise cases. Consider the definitions of religion 
252. "[I]t is important to have some objective guidelines in order to avoid ad hoc justice." 
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J. concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
253. GRIFFIN BROWN, supra note 165, at 191. 
254. "Monotheism posits a god whose essential attribute is that he [sic] is all-
powerful. . .. But his power is most devastatingly that of an idea in people's minds, 
which leads them to obey him ... and to reject other deities .... " RICH, supra note 185, 
at 66. 
255. Many other religions may have, to varying degrees, concerns about, and some need 
for explanations and answers. However, I argue here that it is inherent in a monotheistic 
religion. Where a dominant religion has pervaded the cultural values, traditions, and 
overall jurisprudence of a society, the problems in defining religion are obvious. 
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that have emerged over the decades in First Amendment cases?56 
"Religion has reference to one's views of his [sic] relations to his Crea~ 
tor, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and charac-
ter, and of obedience to his will. ,,257 This theistic idea of religion held sway 
well into this century. A move away from this narrow view began not in 
constitutional cases, but in cases interpreting draft laws and exemptions. In 
both United States v. Seege.,J58 and Welsh v. United States,259 the Court 
went beyond a theistic perspective (which was reflected in the military's 
conscientious objector exemption) to what was considered a more progres-
sive approach. Beliefs that were "based upon a power or being, or upon a 
faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately 
dependent,,260 were deemed to be sufficient for purposes of conscientious 
objector status. This followed what the Court had earlier done in Torcaso v. 
T¥atkins. 261 While the Court in Yoder,262 pulled back somewhat from this 
broad reading, this expanded idea of what constitutes religion (i.e., theism is 
no longer the determinative factor) still carries great weight with courtS.263 
However, contained within this clearly Judeo-Christian framework are tenets 
I have already described-preference for written over oral traditions, a sub-
ordinate view of women, and nature as subordinate to people.264 Thus, a re-
ligious belief that "all a person knows is placed in the ground when that per-
son is buried. . . ." and therefore flooding or moving those bodies destroys 
not only the knowledge and beliefs of the buried person, but those particular 
teachings as well,265 clearly stands outside of courts' general views and un-
derstandings about religion, and is ill served by even a non-theistic defmi-
tion.266 
256. The Internal Revenue Service also grapples with determining what constitutes a re-
ligion. While it does not have a fixed definition, it tends to rely on guidelines to determine 
tax-exempt status. See Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and 
the Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L.REv. 855, 877-79 (1993); Terry A. Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar: Defining 
"Religion" For Purposes of Administering Religion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'y 219 (1983). 
257. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
258. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
259. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
260. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added). 
261. 367 U.S. 488. The Court held that government cannot favor religions which were 
based on a belief in the existence of God over religions which were not. Id. at 495. 
262. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). 
263. "Under the modem view, 'religion' is not confined to the relationship of man with 
his Creator, either as a matter oflaw or as a matter of theology. Even theologians oftradi-
tionally recognized faiths have moved away from a strictly Theistic approach in explaining 
their own religions." Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., con-
curring) (citations omitted). 
264. See supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text. 
265. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162. 
266. This was demonstrated in the Sequoyah case, where demands for water superseded 
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The defmition now used by the courts, on its face and as it has been in-
terpreted and applied, generally favors only those systems of belief that are 
based on and advance very particular principles. First, the belief system 
must turn on an egocentric view of the world; "above all else, religions are 
characterized by their adherence to and promotion of certain 'underlying 
theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe. ",267 Second, this 
defmition is predisposed towards those religions that establish a hierarchical 
view of the world, within the religion and without. "Religion, as compre-
hended by the fIrst amendment now includes mere affIrmation of belief in a 
supreme being .... ,,268 Thus, the move away from a rigid defInitional re-
quirement of a belief in "God" to one that also allows for a broader mono-
theistic non-theistic perspective, while something of a progression, does not 
yet ensure constitutional protections for earth-based religions. One impedi-
ment to real progress is the fact that new defmitions of religion are wedded 
to a Judeo-Christian model of hierarchy. 
When faced with less familiar religions, courts apply a "defInition by 
analogy.,,269 "The modern approach thus looks to the familiar religions as 
models in order to ascertain, by comparison, whether the new set of ideas or 
beliefs is confronting the same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as 
unquestioned and accepted 'religions. ",270 The three general criteria for what 
constitutes religion that are currently being applied in cases are: 
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions hav-
ing to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is 
comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief system as opposed to 
an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by 
the presence of certain formal and external signS.271 
any right to protect religious beliefs and practices. While the court here, as in other sacred 
site cases, recognized the beliefs asserted as religious ("the Cherokees have a religion 
within the meaning of the Constitution"), id. at 1163, the recognition had no practical 
value. The beliefs and practices, because they stood outside of Judeo-Christian principles 
and perspectives and values, were therefore not appreciated and not protected in the same 
way that "mainstream" religious beliefs have been. 
267. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025,1033 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
908 (1982). 
268. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 199 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Seeger, 380 
U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
269. Id. at 207 (Adams, 1., concurring). 
270. Id. (emphasis added). 
271. A/rica, 662 F.2d at 1032, (citing Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207-10 (Adams, 1., concur-
ring)). See also Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting Malnak crite-
ria). The Callahan opinion was written by Judge Adams, sitting by designation. I am not 
going to discuss this third indicium as I think that its meaning and interpretations are obvi-
ous. Judge Adams, in his concurrence in Malnak, when discussing this third indicium, 
notes: "Of course, a religion may exist without any of these signs .... " Malnak, 592 F.2d 
at 209. However, his footnote immediately following that statement quotes Durkheim as 
stating: "In all history, we do not find a single religion without a Church [sic]." Id., at 
n.44 (citation omitted). In earth-based religions, where one's relationship with his or her 
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Because of the inherent problems with a defmition generally, and the 
defmitions currently in use, in particular, this "new" approach offers no 
greater protections to "other" religions than did earlier analyses. As to the 
fIrst criteria, the use of the word "ultimate"-in the ordinary sense of the 
word, fmal-is not a concept that generally has application in earth-based 
religions. On its face the word does not appear problematic. However, the 
interpretation makes clear it is a value-laden term. 272 In United States v. 
Kauten, for example, ultimate concern was understood to mean that a be-
liever would "accept martyrdom" and "disregard elementary self-interest" 
rather than violate his or her religious beliefs.273 In Africa, the term 
"ultimate concerns" was applied to the detriment of MOVE, which was held 
not to be a religion because there was no recognition of "a Supreme Being or 
transcendental or all-controlling force.,,274 Thus the fIrst indicium currently 
determinative of what constitutes a religion seems to require a showing that 
one must be willing to martyr himself or herself, or at least subscribe to a 
hierarchical ordering of the universe. 
Additionally, what is meant by "ultimate" concerns or ideas is generally 
understood to be teachings or answers to questions regarding issues such as 
one's role in the universe and matters of right and wrong. "A science course 
may touch on many ultimate concerns, but it is unlikely to proffer a sys-
tematic series of answers to them that might begin to resemble a religion. ,,275 
Moreover, it is not suffIcient that a religion pose the question and provide 
the answer. It must do so in a comprehensive and wide ranging way. There-
dieties is very much a personal matter, and there is no real hierarchy imposed or required 
in order to worship or pray, neither is there any need for buildings or specific organiza-
tional structures. 
272. Jesse Choper has noted several specific problems with the "ultimate concerns" test. 
CHOPER, supra note 7, at 70-74. He notes that it automatically excludes a number ofrelig-
ious traditions, id. at 71; that application of this concept to legal problems, when it was 
primarily aimed at theologians and laypersons (formulated by the theologian Paul Tillich) 
oversimplifies a complex theological argument; and finally, people may have ultimate con-
cerns about a number of issues. This last point then, he argues, "is at odds with an impor-
tant historical assumption that underlies the constitutional protection granted by the Relig-
ion Clauses: that religion comprehends matters with which the government . . . is not 
competent to interfere." Id. at 72. George Freeman has also identified numerous prob-
lems with the ultimate concerns test. See Freeman, supra note 251, at 1534-41. 
273. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703,708 (2d Cir. 1943). The idea of martyrdom 
and a disregard of "elementary self-interest" would seem, in and of itself, to reinforce 
ideas of hierarchy, and is a concept with historical links to Judea-Christian traditions but 
not necessarily earth-based ones. Additionally, George Freeman has shown how unwork-
able this interpretation is. He notes that "self-interest might be an individual's ultimate 
concern." Freeman, supra note 251, at 1535 (emphasis added). 
274. A/rica, 662 F.2d at 1033. The Court described MOVE as having an ideology requir-
ing its members to "live in harmony with what is natural, or untainted." Id. at 1027. It is 
also described as a "revolutionary organization." Id. at 1026. 
275. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, 1., concurring) (emphasis added). See also Af-
rica, 662 F.2d at 1033. Also, as Freeman notes, an "ultimate concern" test for free exer-
cise has the end result of a standard "so narrow that only a few could expect to enjoy its 
protection." Freeman, supra note 251, at 1541. 
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fore, as the court in Malnak noted, "certain isolated answers to ultimate 
questions, however, are not necessarily 'religious' answers, because they 
lack the comprehensiveness, the second of the three indicia. ,,276 Thus, a re-
ligion must "lay claim to an ultimate and comprehensive 'truth. ",277 But 
this defmition is nothing if not an almost exact likeness of the monotheistic, 
Judeo-Christian perspective. It harks back to Biblical teachings of "I am 
the way, the truth .... ,,278 This defmition requires absolutes, that is, the 
emphasis is on the destination, not the journey.279 Thus, despite declarations 
to the contrary, a non-hierarchical belief system that prefers and embraces 
the mystery to the solution, and the idea of god as adjective or verb and not 
as noun, is not and will not be truly acknowledged as a religion, for the pur-
poses of receiving the same types of protection afforded "mainstream" relig-
ions. 
B. FEAR OF FLYING 
The desire for a defmition of religion is tied to an absolute reluctance to 
treat religious freedom cases on an "ad hoc" basis. While this reluctance is 
one generally present in the law overall, it is also true that the law does rec-
ognize and accept the need for ad hoc determinations, the "best interests of 
the child" in custody determinations being, perhaps, the most obvious ex-
ample.280 Although a court may acknowledge the need for "flexibility and 
careful consideration,,,281 there is a marked preference for avoiding ad hoc 
justice. I believe that the free exercise of religion is best served by no defi-
nition, and by a case-by-case deterrrunation. Less, not more dogma, is re-
quired here. If courts genuinely recognized the predispositions inherent in 
existing free exercise jurisprudence, and undertook to consciously and ex-
plicitly ignore them, they could then, without any need for a defmition of re-
ligion, truly hear and analyze each claim of free exercise on its own merits. 
Indeed, by explicitly rejecting both the existing defmition of religion and any 
grail-like quest for a valid definition, courts would be able to come much 
closer to something resembling a genuine model of religious freedom. Under 
this scenario, one would no longer fmd a court reflexively applying a be-
276. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208-09 (Adams, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
277. Id. at 209 (Adams, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
278. 14 John 9 (emphasis added). 
279. This is also seen in the emphasis in the idea of heaven and hell, i.e., the preoccupa-
tion with life after death. In many earth-based religions, by contrast, how one lives one's 
life is important not for what it may guarantee after death, but because it is precisely one's 
relationship with all other living beings during one's life that matters. 
280. I am not prepared here to address the debates surrounding court custody determina-
tions or the appropriateness of the best interest standard. I am simply asserting that courts, 
lawyers, academics and/or legislatures have sometimes arrived at the conclusion that fair-
ness, in some instances, is best served by a case by case determination, with only the very 
broadest of guidelines established. 
281. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 210 (Adams, J., concurring). 
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lief/conduct dichotomy to a religious claim where the religion itself adheres 
to no such distinction.282 Nor would a court automatically assume that rec-
reational use of public lands has greater value than the need to keep sacred 
the place of a people's teachings, rituals and deities. 
An authentically just free exercise jurisprudence cannot exist if the un-
derlying approach is one that remains grounded in a strict, monotheistic, hi-
erarchical religious perspective. Such a view requires absolutes, and thus 
dogmas, and thus an inherent rejection of the "other." I urge, instead, an 
approach that embraces uncertainty, which contains within it an openness to 
"other" possibilities; other views; other roads. 
CONCLUSION 
The Free Exercise Clause has been, since the early days of the Constitu-
tion, predisposed towards Judea-Christian religions and against earth-based 
religions. Judea-Christian traditions have permeated how courts think about 
and treat what is and isn't deemed religion, for the purposes of extending 
constitutional protections. Not only have certain traditional Judea-Christian 
characteristics colored any defmition of religion and analysis of religious 
claims, they have also shaped the very approach typically applied in free ex-
ercise cases. The reaching out for a defmition, not simply the defmition it-
self, and the avoidance of "ad hoc" justice derive from particular religious 
traditions that do not readily apply, and often stand in complete opposition 
to, earth-based religions. Until such time as courts are truly committed to 
abandoning both the defmition and the reluctance to treat each religious 
claim on its own terms, it is not possible for earth-based religions to achieve 
equal and fair treatment under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. 
282. Indeed, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in Smith, the First Amendment does not 
make such a distinction. Empl. Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 893 (1990). 
